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MEDICAL MONITORING WITHOUT
PHYSICAL INJURY: THE LEAST JUSTICE




VER the past two decades a growing minority of state courts
decided to grant tort relief to accident victims who manifest no
physical injury but have been put at long-term risk of death or
disease as a result of exposure to industrial activity at toxic dumps, pro-
duction of dangerous drugs and other consumer products, or being in
hazardous workplaces. While courts have suggested the possibility of or-
dering relief in auto accident cases,' nearly all of the cases have involved
environmental or toxic torts involving contamination from landfills,
2
groundwater poisoning, 3 petroleum products,4 insecticides, 5 organic
chemicals, 6 radioactive emissions,7 tobacco products, 8 and asbestos.9 The
earliest cases granted the victims of unripened, but threatened, illness a
* Professor Richard W. Bourne is a Professor of Law at University of Baltimore
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (dictum); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 572 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (dictum).
2. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 801 (Cal. 1993)
(toxic chemicals from tire factory); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242,
244 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (ground seepage and air .dispersion of toxic substances from
Love Canal industrial chemical and waste disposal landfill).
3. See, e.g., Potter, 863 P.2d at 801; Miranda, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572; Ayers v. Town-
ship of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
4. See, e.g., Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. W. Va. 1993).
5. See, e.g., Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 35 F.3d 717, 732 (3d Cir. 1994); Ball v.
Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 37 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829, 835 (3d Cir. 1990); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir.
1986), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1471 (D. Colo. 1991);
Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 874 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
8. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 1998); Duncan v.
N.W. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 603 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
9. Most numerous by far are the asbestos cases, which are legion. See, e.g., Metro-N.
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 426 (1997); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp.,
752 P.2d 28, 29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Gutierrez v. Cassiar Mining Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d
132, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 356 (La.
1998).
SMU LAW REVIEW
common law right to have the defendant pay, as damages, the costs of
medical screening that doctors would counsel a plaintiff to incur in order
to assure early detection and treatment of those maladies the accident
had made more likely to develop, often at a remote future date.10 A
number of courts also ordered monitoring relief, not as an item of dam-
ages, but through exercise of the courts' equitable powers, to compel de-
fendants to supply or underwrite plaintiffs' future medical monitoring
expenses when they would not have had to be incurred but for the fact
that defendant had increased plaintiffs' risk. Medical screening was seen
as a means of permitting early detection and treatment to minimize the
threat defendants' conduct had caused to plaintiffs' mortality and
morbidity. 1
10. One of the first cases to approve a damages award to pay for future medical moni-
toring where there had been no physical injury yet sustained was Askey v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Askey suggested that medical mon-
itoring relief before injury might be appropriate if injury were proven to be probable as an
item of consequential damages, but dismissed the plaintiffs' class action because what the
class plaintiff asked the court to certify was too indefinite. Id. at 247-48. The first state
supreme court decision to hold that medical monitoring damages should be awarded was
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), which upheld an award of legal
damages for future medical costs. Id. at 312. A number of other courts have taken the
same position. See, e.g., Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993); In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990); Hagerty, 797 F.2d 256; Herber
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1986); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515, 1523 (D. Kan. 1995); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F.
Supp. 847, 849 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal.
1993); Bowerman v. United Illuminating, 23 Conn. L. Reptr. 589 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998);
Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52, 57 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (workers compensation);
Betts v. Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust, 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 360; Meyerhoff v. Turner Constr. Co., 534 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995), vacated, 575 NW.2d 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Bower v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 434 (W. Va. 1999).
11. The earliest monitoring case involved an injunction, not an award of damages. In
that case, Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 819, a group of infant children survived an
explosive decompression and airplane crash that threatened them with a neurological de-
velopment disorder. Representatives of the children sought damages, but many had no
obvious injuries, rather, they suffered a substantial likelihood that the disorder would de-
velop. Id. at 818-19. The trial judge found that early detection and remedial treatment
would likely reduce the severity of any mental disorder attributable to the decompression
and crash and failure to engage in early diagnosis would lead to irreparable injury to many
of the children. Id. After interminable delays in the litigation, the trial judge issued a
preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to fund a thorough regime of neurological
testing to see whether each of the children had been injured. Id. The court of appeals
upheld the injunction. In explaining its holding, the court of appeals laid out a hypotheti-
cal case in which
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding through a red
light. Jones lands on his head with some force. Understandably shaken,
Jones enters a hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery
of tests to determine whether he has suffered any internal ... injuries. The
tests prove negative, but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the
substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations.
Id. at 825. In the court's view, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the cost of the examina-
tions from the motorcyclist. Such a recovery would promote compensation, deter miscon-
duct, and "accord[ I with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice which underlie
the common law of tort." Id.
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 287 and Potter, 863 P.2d at 795, both relied upon Friends for All
Children in rationalizing a damages award. Although they upheld lump sum damages
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Claims for medical monitoring prior to injury are only one of several
types of claims victims of toxic torts have recently brought to seek redress
for exposure to toxins before the victims have developed symptoms of
disease. Plaintiffs have also sought damages for enhanced risk of getting
sick as a result of exposure, and damages for non-intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Some writers have lumped all three theories together
"under the loose banners of 'future injury' or 'inchoate torts." 1 2
The drive to hold defendants liable on one or more of these theories
has developed in recent years because of a wave of cases involving expo-
sure to products, known to be toxic to human beings, but which often do
not cause symptoms of illness until after long periods of time-sometimes
decades. Under traditional doctrines, a cause of action for personal in-
jury is not ripe until the victim becomes symptomatic; a lawsuit filed
before some injury could be diagnosed would be premature. Yet waiting
is not in the best interests of the victim. Statutes of limitations may pre-
clude any action in cases in which the time period between the tortious
activity and manifestation of disease is so protracted. Even when these
obstacles are overcome with discovery rules and the like, 13 statutes of
repose may preclude a suit, and the passage of time may make proof of
liability and causation extremely difficult. 14
awards, each of those courts indicated a preference for equitable orders mandating that
defendants fund the victims' medical monitoring costs in the future. In recent years, many
of the courts that upheld medical monitoring relief in the absence of physical injury have
opted for equitable orders. See Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466,
1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that plaintiff could maintain claim for equitable relief);
Burns, 752 P.2d at 34 (ordering creation of court-supervised fund); Petito v. A.H. Robins
Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 107-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (ordering court supervised fund);
Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997) (ordering medical
monitoring trust fund); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 982 (Utah
1993) (requiring use of court's equitable powers to set up court supervised fund to adminis-
ter surveillance payments or alternatively to require defendant to pay for insurance fund to
cover plaintiffs future monitoring needs).
12. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REv.
1625, 1629 (2002) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky].
13. If the statutes of limitation are deemed to run from the time of exposure or inhala-
tion of a toxin, they can cut off a right to sue long before a plaintiff realizes she is injured.
A number of courts have applied a discovery rule to provide relief from this problem,
particularly in asbestos cases. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111,
116 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tex. 2000);
Hansen, 858 P.2d at 973 (dictum).
14. For discussion of statutes of repose, see generally Francis E. McGovern, The Status
of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Products Liability Actions: Present and
Future, 16 FORUM 416 (1980); Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutional-
ity of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 579 (1981). As McGovern
points out, the operation of these statutes can prevent a plaintiff from ever having a right to
sue to redress injuries she suffers; this happens, for instance when, by the time a claim
ripens sufficiently to become a cause of action, the right to sue for redress is cut off by a
statute of repose. See 16 FORUM at 418-19.
The difficulties of belated proof of toxic torts are quite substantial. See John S. Apple-
gate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Sub-
stances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991); Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical
Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 Hous. L. REV.
473, 479-80 (1996); Ann Taylor, Comment, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the
Evolution of Tort Law, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 760, 766 (1994); Allan T. Slagel,
20051
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The banners that loosely cover the claims for enhanced risk, emotional
distress, and medical monitoring should not obfuscate the fact that they
are clearly different. The first category, cases of enhanced risk, involves
no claim of present injury at all; what is claimed is that a plaintiff has
been exposed in a way that increases her risk of serious illness well be-
yond that of unexposed persons. The claim seeks damages for the future
disease discounted by the likelihood that she might not contract the dis-
ease at all.' 5 The second category, damages claims for emotional distress,
seeks to find present damage resulting from the fear and knowledge of
the harmful exposure. The third category, medical monitoring claims,
deals with enhanced risk but does not seek damages for the risk itself;
instead, the claim attempts to find present injury in the ongoing medical
diagnostic costs that a reasonable physician would suggest to the plaintiff
in order to ensure prompt diagnosis of any illness that a defendant's ac-
tivity has made more likely. Although the theories differ considerably,' 6
it should not be surprising that many plaintiffs' lawyers have sought relief
on two or more of these theories contemporaneously. 17
Opponents of the move to create a right to medical monitoring relief
when defendant has tortiously placed plaintiff in need of medical surveil-
lance but has not yet suffered physical injury oppose such relief on sev-
eral grounds. Aside from recognizing that the traditional rule requires
physical injury and permits monitoring relief only as an item of conse-
quential or parasitic damages after physical injury has been demon-
strated,18 opponents' arguments suggest that proof of any real threat of
Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Tort
Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849, 853 (1988) [hereinafter Slagel].
15. See John J. Kalas, Medical Surveillance Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Half-
Hearted Embrace, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 126, 135 (1992).
16. A number of articles have discussed and differentiated among the three theories.
See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad:
Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53
S.C. L. REv. 815 (2002) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski]; Kalas, supra note 15; Slagel,
supra note 14.
17. Sometimes lawyers filed claims involving all three theories; this was particularly
true in the eighties and early nineties, before the law began to become settled in this area.
See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d 315; Herber, 785 F.2d 79; Burns, 752 P.2d 28; Potter, 863 P.2d
795; Ayers, 527 A.2d 287. More commonly, especially in recent years, plaintiffs have fo-
cused on medical monitoring and emotional distress theories, leaving out enhanced risk.
See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. 424; Ball, 958 F.2d 36; Barth, 673 F. Supp. 1466; Dragon v.
Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 726 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Hansen, 858 P.2d
970.
18. Henderson and Twerski accurately point out that the medical monitoring cases
"combine elements of failure to rescue and pure economic loss." Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 16, at 846. Others, however, see the creation of an equitable duty to repair or
rescue by eliminating economic loss as an indication of imagination that opens the door to
worthwhile policy discussion about the extent to which monitoring ought to be ordered to
mitigate loss and increase epidemiological understanding of toxic exposures. See, e.g.,
Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of Limits, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1975, 1977, 1982-83 (2002) [hereinafter Abraham]; Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics
of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REv. 1921,
1935-37, 1946-47 (2002) [hereinafter Geistfeld]. Henderson and Twerski see this as an indi-
cator for caution. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 846.
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injury before victims become symptomatic is too scientifically uncertain
to warrant judicial interference 19 and that monitoring relief rarely, if ever,
has any real medical efficacy.20 Opponents also claim that the number
and size of the potential claims threatens to hamstring, and even bank-
rupt, businesses, causing overdeterrence and, in some cases, leaving insuf-
ficient funds to compensate tort victims who suffer more serious physical
injuries. 21 Further, opponents argue that generally allowing such claims
will promote a torrent of expensive and largely wasteful litigation.
22
Rather than imposing huge costs on industry, the argument is frequently
made that society would be better off if it forced victims to absorb these
costs through medical insurance, either because that is a more "efficient"
way of handling the problem,23 or because, in the end, the fear and ex-
pense people may suffer as a result of tortious exposures to toxins are of
negligible consequence. 24 In the name of limiting these untoward conse-
19. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 843; Victor E. Schwartz et al.,
Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1071-72
(1999) [hereinafter Schwartz].
20. See THOMAS M. GOUTMAN, MEDICAL MONrTORING: How BAD SCIENCE MAKES
BAD LAW, 6 (2001) [hereinafter Goutman] (claiming medical science indicates only six
tests may properly be used for screening healthy patients for latent disease); Schwartz,
supra note 19, at 1073.
21. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 843-44, 850; Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking
Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1998) [hereinafter Klein]; Susan L. Mar-
tin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: Warranted or Wasteful?, 20
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 130-31 (1995) [hereinafter Martin & Martin].
22. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 844; Martin & Martin, supra note 21, at
142. Martin and Martin suggest that "in the very near future we may all have reasonable
grounds to allege that some negligent business exposed us to hazardous substances and to
get medical experts to testify ... [as to a] reasonable medical necessity for us to receive
regular medical testing." Martin & Martin, supra note 21, at 130-31. Henderson and Twer-
ski are equally pessimistic: "The specter of a massive, never ending queue of claimants is
very real." Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 850.
23. Noting that the transactional costs of litigation aimed at forcing corporations to
internalize the costs of their delicts is high, a number of writers recommend having plain-
tiffs buy their own insurance to handle the problem. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 16, at 844 (stating that medical monitoring relief is unnecessary for the "large majority
of Americans ... covered by ... general health insurance which presumably is in place to
carry the lion's part.., of the financial burden of medical monitoring"); Martin & Martin,
supra note 21, at 142-43 (calling for national health insurance or, in the alternative, for
plaintiff-funded medical insurance coverage). These writers concede that universal cover-
age is presently unavailable, so an argument based on this sanguine view of reality admit-
tedly fails for those without coverage. If a medical monitoring regime were fully in place
and cost what these writers suggest, it is not altogether certain that general health insur-
ance plans would not be modified to provide, at most, secondary coverage, with accompa-
nying changes in insurance rates. Alternatively, it is likely that in some cases, including
those of known toxic spills affecting large communities, private health insurance would dry
up for the victims.
24. Invocation of the economic harm rule is a stand-in for this argument. The eco-
nomic harm rule prevents tort plaintiffs from recovering for purely economic injury unless
they are in privity with the defendant and have "directly" suffered loss as a result of some
sort of economic tort (e.g., malpractice, fraud, etc.). See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery
for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).
The action for damages for the future cost of medical screening is hard to reconcile with
the economic harm rule. See also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1706.
But as Rabin points out, the purpose of the economic harm rule is to limit the scope of
liability to assure that the tort "punishment" is proportional to the "wrongfulness" of the
20051
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quences, some writers alternatively recommend that monitoring relief be
limited to those who can prove by externally-adopted standards a high
probability that their exposure will make them fall ill,25 or at the least,
tortfeasor's behavior. Rabin, supra at 1534-38. It is certainly true that economic harms fall
lower on one's priority scale than physical injuries, and that this normative judgment is one
the common law has made for a long time. See Geistfeld, supra note 18, at 1937. But
medical monitoring is done to protect a person's health that is put in jeopardy by a defen-
dant. As Geistfeld points out, one would think that the security interests of the medical
monitoring plaintiffs would warrant considerable solicitude as compared to the economic
interests of defendants. Id. This is especially true when one sees that the tortfeasors in-
volved were quite blameworthy, which was the case in many of the monitoring cases. Con-
sider, in this regard, the owners of landfills guilty of poisoning ground-water from toxic
dumping in violation of safety regulations and known safety risks in Potter, 863 P.2d 795;Ayers, 525 A.2d 287; Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d 137, or the asbestos company that
blew asbestos fibers from its factory into a neighboring trailer park in Burns, 752 P.2d 28,
or the employer who lied to its employees about whether asbestos was being loosened at
their work site in Hansen, 858 P.2d 970. But the purveyors of the economic harm rule
denigrate the nature of plaintiff's economic injuries, arguing that defendants should not be
made responsible for them so that people who are really hurt, that is, those who ultimately
fall sick will be sure to get recoveries.
Related to the economic harm rule is a set of nearly polemic arguments regarding the
worthiness of medical screening claims. There is the strong suggestion that judges have
bought into medical monitoring because of "exogenous factors" like "popular culture's"
tendency to "seize upon a... few ... relatively minor risks from among many... and focus
our collective energies on 'solving' those problems." Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16,
at 847. Henderson and Twerski also opine that judges recognize medical monitoring be-
cause they kowtowed to the environmental movement and the machinations of academics,
"especially authors of student notes," and have been persuaded by ambitious members of a
greedy plaintiff's bar. Id. at 848-49. Aside from the rather ad hominem suggestion thatjudges upholding medical monitoring are weakminded, these arguments often denigrate
the harm plaintiffs fear in the monitoring cases with epithets that scarcely hide the con-
tempt of critics. Perhaps the highwater mark of this kind of argument was the early (and
rather widespread) characterization of plaintiffs' fears of contracting cancer as
"cancerphobia." See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 n.24 (6th
Cir. 1988); Fournier J. Gale, III & James L. Goyer, III, Recovery for Cancerphobia and
Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1985). As the California Supreme
Court wryly pointed out, there is a proper distinction between phobic reactions which
involve mental illness due to recurrent dread "in the absence of objective danger," and fear
of cancer which, in many cases, involves perfectly proper anxiety in the face of the threat of
developing cancer and is certainly no evidence of mental illness. See Potter, 863 P.2d at 804
n.5. I am unaware of any case approving medical monitoring that comes even close to
recommending it as an appropriate response to phobic fears of toxic poisoning.
25. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1998); Hagerty,
788 F.2d 315; DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Potter, 863
P.2d 795; Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242. As the California Supreme Court made clear in Potter,
this position is a close correlative of the view that monitoring relief should not be awarded
unless plaintiff has suffered present demonstrable injury. See Potter, 863 P.2d at 822 (citing
Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W. Va. 1990), aff'd, 958 F.2d 36 (4th
Cir. 1991), and Villari, 663 F. Supp. at 735). This is the position that the California Su-
preme Court took in Potter with respect to negligent infliction of emotional distress and
that many courts have taken with respect to enhanced risk theories of relief. See, e.g.,
Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 315; Herber, 785 F.2d 79; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 287-with the altogether
predictable result that application of the standard is the death knell to the risk in question.
The stricter standard gives plaintiffs a more difficult task in demonstrating entitlement to
medical monitoring relief because they have to prove, through expert testimony often
backed by scientific support, that there is a reasonable certainty that the exposure to toxic
materials will in fact result in physical injury. Commentators agree that this task is likely to
be insurmountable. See, e.g., Kalas, supra note 15, at 133; Martin & Martin, supra note 21,
at 128; Slagel, supra note 14, at 854.
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that if they fall ill, it is only because they were wronged by defendant. 26
This paper takes the position that the claims for money damages in all
these areas should fail. Nevertheless, it argues that traditional equity
doctrines should afford plaintiffs prospective medical monitoring relief to
mitigate a plaintiff's fears and risk of death or serious harm. The courts
should order defendants to afford a plaintiff's medical monitoring when-
ever a defendant's misconduct has created a clearly legitimate fear of en-
hanced risk of death or serious illness and medical monitoring could ease
these fears while at the same time allowing for early detection and suc-
cessful treatment of the maladies. In the author's view, plaintiffs' lawyers
have erred by mischaracterizing their claims in such a way as to risk rejec-
tion on both doctrinal and practical grounds. Pre-injury medical screen-
ing costs should not be awarded to pay damages to cover future medical
expenses involved in screening for disease, as most of the successful med-
ical monitoring cases have argued. Nor should the claims for medical
monitoring be segregated from the claims involving the emotional dis-
tress associated with fear of threatened harm. Instead, a claim for future
medical monitoring should be perceived as an equitable order aimed at
requiring the defendant to mitigate the plaintiff's fears and risk of harm
caused by the defendant's misconduct. This could be accomplished by
providing medical screening services to a plaintiff, whenever those ser-
vices have medical efficacy, by providing for early detection and success-
ful treatment of the illnesses that the defendant's tortious conduct may
have caused or rendered more likely to occur. In short, while eschewing
To understand why plaintiffs have tended to avoid pursuing claims under this standard,
consider how restrictive it is. A sixty-year-old man who has smoked two packs of ciga-
rettes a day for forty years would not fall within the standard, although few would argue
that his risk of lung cancer is tremendously enhanced by his smoking history, and this fact
can be verified with epidemiological studies running back to before the issuance of the
Surgeon General's Report in 1964. Limiting medical monitoring relief to plaintiffs who
can prove with such studies-which, with respect to most toxins, are simply presently un-
available-that they are more likely than not to contract the feared disease, sets the stan-
dards of proof so high and narrows the definition of the class of victims so tightly as to
make the theory singularly unattractive to run-of-the-mill victims of toxic exposures signifi-
cant enough to open them up to very substantial risk of long-term harm.
26. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 21, at 16, 18-21; Matthew D. Hamrick, Comment, Theo-
ries of Injury and Recovery for Post-Exposure, Pre-Symptom Plaintiffs: The Supreme Court
Takes a Critical Look, 29 Cum,. L. REv. 461, 486 (1998) [hereinafter Hamrick]. The heart
of Professor Klein's argument goes to causation; in his view, forcing defendants to pay for
preventative medical care for plaintiffs should only occur if the defendants would ulti-
mately be forced to pay the plaintiffs medical costs because of a finding that the defend-
ants caused the plaintiffs' injuries; going beyond that and imposing mere medical screening
costs on defendants that plaintiffs might not have incurred but for what defendants did
would increase deterrence against defendants' enterprises by forcing them to pay costs
they otherwise would not have to pay because contracting the disease in question could not
be laid at their feet. Of course, broader relief, while it increases deterrence for defendants,
may not lead to "overdeterrence;" it may simply mean that defendants are to be required
to bear a larger share of the costs of their enterprises than they would, but for monitoring
relief regimes, have been able to pass off to others. Henderson and Twerski, though unal-
terably opposed to medical monitoring before injury in any context, nevertheless opined




claims for damages for medical monitoring or for non-intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, this article argues that the courts have ample
equitable power to order preventative relief in the form of reparative in-junctions mandating that voluntary medical screening services be made
available to tort victims to limit the emotional distress, medical expenses,
and increased mortality that a tortfeasor may have inflicted on innocent
victims.
The rationale for allowing such a claim is simple. When a person is
threatened with the substantial likelihood of contracting a serious disease
in the future that could be effectively treated if detected early through
readily-available medical monitoring procedures, in most cases, a physi-
cian would recommend a monitoring regime if early detection and treat-
ment would likely alleviate the chances that the threatened future onset
of disease will cause serious disease or death in the future. Such a course
of treatment gives the person a realistic sense that she is doing everything
within her power to avoid an untimely demise that she otherwise must
helplessly sit by and pray will not occur, thus diminishing-though not
entirely eliminating-her emotional distress, and at the same time, prom-
ising to prevent or limit the disease's negative impact on her lifespan and
future health. It seems elementary that the defendant, having wrongfully
put the plaintiff in the position she is in, should alleviate it by paying for
medical monitoring when such monitoring would, under current profes-
sional medical judgments, be efficacious in improving plaintiff's mortality
and long-term health prospects. At the same time, it would lighten the
plaintiff's emotional burden of having to face the unknown by being able
to undergo preventative medical treatment for early detection.
I. THE DRIVE TO PERMIT MEDICAL MONITORING RELIEF
WITHOUT PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY
The movement toward granting medical monitoring relief began in
1987 with Ayers v. Township of Jackson.27 Ayers was the first case de-
cided by a state supreme court in what became a long series of toxic tort
decisions where plaintiffs sought relief for medical monitoring, uninten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and enhanced risk of disease.
Though differing in detail, most of these cases suggested that
courts should grant medical monitoring relief when a defendant's mis-
conduct or tortious activity28 had caused a plaintiff's exposure to
27. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
28. In an early article following the Love Canal Disaster, two writers suggested a wide
variety of liability theories for toxic tort cases, including negligence, trespass, nuisance, and
strict liability. See William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic
Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFsTRA L. Rav. 859 (1981) [hereinafter Ginsberg & Weiss].
Although the primary theory actually used is negligence, all four theories have been used
to ground medical monitoring claims. See Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring
Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Tort Litiga-
tion, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 671-72 (1992) [hereinafter Blumenberg]. In the tobacco litiga-
tion context, "claims for medical monitoring relief have been tied to causes of action in
torts and contracts, including fraud, failure to warn, misrepresentation, strict liability,"
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toxins29 and subjected them to a significant increase in the risk of con-
tracting a serious future illness that could be treated or mitigated if de-
tected early through medically advisable screening procedures. 30 At the
same time, most courts rejected claims of enhanced risk and non-inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.31
Industry fought all of these claims on the basis of the traditional com-
mon law rule that there could be no tort liability until a plaintiff had
suffered physical injury. To uphold the emotional distress claims, it ar-
gued, would invite suits by phony or phobic plaintiffs with wildly specula-
breach of warranty (express and implied), negligence, "intentional infliction of emotional
distress, intentional exposure to a hazardous substance, and violation of consumer protec-
tion statutes." Badillo v. Am. Brands, 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001) (citations omitted). In
one case involving exposure to blood products of patients carrying the human immu-
nodeficiency virus and close contact with a person sick with active tuberculosis, a state
court found liability for medical monitoring under the state's workers' compensation stat-
ute. Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). Finally, attempts have
been made to base liability on statutes, such as the Federal Employers Liability Act, the
Jones Act, and a variety of state enactments designed to protect consumers or the environ-
ment. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (FELA);
Dragon v. CooperfT. Smith Stevedoring Co., 726 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Jones
Act); Redland, 696 A.2d 137 (Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act).
29. The variety of kinds of exposure for which plaintiffs have sought medical monitor-
ing relief is suggested in the text supra notes 1-9. Most involve environmental disasters,
unsafe worksites, or claims involving alleged products liability.
30. A substantial majority of the cases awarding medical monitoring relief require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the condition warranting screening can be detected early and
that early detection will improve mortality or morbidity. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990); Potter, 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Bourgeois v. A.P.
Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858
P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 1993); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 287. A small minority have not required
plaintiff to show that medical science presently makes early treatment likely to improve
plaintiff's health prospects. See Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 146 n.8; Bower v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 434 (W. Va. 1999). Both courts indicated a reluc-
tance to deprive plaintiff of information that might be helpful in the future as medical
science advances; Bower added the view that allowing recovery even without the promise
of medical relief that early detection might permit was appropriate to give a plaintiff peace
of mind, a chance "of getting his financial affairs in order, making lifestyle changes, and
even perhaps, making peace with estranged loved ones or with his religion." 522 A.2d at
434 (quoting Chief Judge Calogero's concurrence in Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 363).
31. See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at 424 (rejecting unintentional emotional distress claim
but reserving question whether some sort of medical monitoring claim might lie); Hagerty
v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986)
(upholding monitoring and emotional distress claim but rejecting claim for enhanced risk);
Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding medical mon-
itoring claim but rejecting enhanced risk and emotional distress claims); Potter, 863 P.2d
795 (upholding medical monitoring but limiting emotional distress and enhanced risk claim
to cases where plaintiff can show prospective physical injury more probable than not);
Dragon, 726 So.2d at 1006 (Jones Act case denying negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim but upholding claim for medical monitoring relief); Bourgeois, 716 So.2d 355
(rejecting enhanced risk but upholding medical monitoring relief); Ayers, 525 A.2d 287
(upholding medical monitoring claim but limiting enhanced risk claim to cases where plain-
tiff can show future physical injury more probable than not); Hansen, 858 P.2d 970 (up-
holding medical monitoring claim but rejecting claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress absent proof of actual illness resulting from tortious conduct); Bower, 522 S.E.2d




tive damages claims that warranted no relief.32 It fought the right to
medical monitoring relief and enhanced risk by arguing that such claims,
in the absence of actual evidence of injury, flew in the face of the ancient
maxim damnum absque injuria, the "no harm/no foul" rule of Anglo-
American tort law that prevents suits for wrongful misconduct unless and
until it has caused a plaintiff some actual injury. Acknowledging that
emotional distress 33 and prospective medical monitoring relief34 are each
often granted in the form of parasitic damages when a defendant's tor-
tious conduct has caused a plaintiff to suffer an actual physical harm, de-
fendants nevertheless asked courts to enforce the traditional rule that
plaintiff has no right to sue for damages in a tort case unless and until the
defendant has in fact suffered physical injury. In the cases where relief
32. The central arguments were not that the plaintiffs seeking emotional distress dam-
ages were all suffering from irrational phobias, although that argument occasionally made
a back-door entrance into the discussion. See discussion of "cancerphobia," supra note 24.
More commonly, the argument was that the physical injury requirement was necessary to
prevent a flood of claims by people whose claimed injuries could be fraudulently made and
hard to controvert. See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433; Hansen, 858 P.2d at 974. Alterna-
tively, physical injury was bona fide but nevertheless so difficult to measure for valuation
purposes as to invite the wildest speculation by juries. See id. In addition, courts expressed
concern lest damages for emotional distress extend liability too far. See id. For much the
same reason that the law uses proximate cause and the economic harm rule to limit the
scope of actionable duty so as to preserve the assets of defendants for classes of victims
more likely to be in need, the law gives priority to those with physical injury over those
whose claims involve stand-alone emotional injury claims. See Geistfeld, supra note 18, at
1934-36. Less often stated in opposition to "pure economic harm" claims was the norma-
tive view that mental distress claims, unless the distress was so acute as to cause physical
symptoms over a long period of time, were trivial and ought to be taken care of by the
distress victims without succor from the tortfeasor or the courts. Hansen, for example,
wanted the bar to emotional distress claims set high because "almost everyone is exposed
from time to time to toxic substances of one sort or another .... [and e]veryone must deal
with stress and anxiety in daily life." 858 P.2d at 975. In the court's view, "[tjransitory
sleeplessness and anxiety do not amount to the type of emotional distress with which a
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope." Id. Similar views
were articulated in Potter, wherein the court noted that emotional distress should only be
compensable when it is so serious that "a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would
be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of
the case." 863 P.2d at 810 n.12 (citation omitted).
For a view that normative values favor treating serious emotional distress as compensa-
ble injury, see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1694-95.
33. See, e.g., Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 678, 674 A.2d 232, 239 (1996); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(a) (1977). The leading cases denying emotional distress claims
acknowledge that emotional distress damages are recoverable when they accompany physi-
cal injury. See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at 430; Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 38 (4th
Cir. 1991). In fact, emotional distress claims without injury are permitted in a narrow
range of special circumstances, including the bystander cases (e.g., plaintiff sees defendant
injuring plaintiff's child), those in which defendant has some special relationship with the
plaintiff (e.g., analyst-patient), as well as those in which the psychological harm is so imme-
diate and overwhelming (e.g., the "fright cases") as to warrant judicial intervention. See
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1663-64; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at
825-27.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(c) (1977); CHARLES MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 90 (1935); JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 5:18:1(2d ed. 1991). The cases rejecting monitoring damages without proof of physical injury
concede ongoing monitoring costs are appropriately recoverable as reasonable medical ex-
penses when they accompany an award for physical injury. See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at
438-39; Ball, 958 F.2d at 39.
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was sought for increased risk of future injury, the plaintiff might never
come down with the malady she claimed threatened her. The physical
injury requirement, it was argued, protected against speculative and
wasteful litigation in cases where injuries are uncertain to ever occur and
left resources available to plaintiffs who finally got sick and were in seri-
ous need of compensation. 35
II. COLLAPSE OF EFFORT TO CREATE CAUSES OF ACTION
BASED ON ENHANCED RISK AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS THEORIES
With few exceptions, these arguments on enhanced risk and negligent
infliction of emotional distress theories prevailed. The courts nearly uni-
versally rejected claims for damages based on the fact that a plaintiff's
exposure to a toxin had increased his risk of later contracting disease.
36
Such claims are a present award for a future injury that may or may not
ever occur.37 Damages in such an action would have to take into account
the fact that a plaintiff might never in fact contract the disease in ques-
tion. Hence, in making the award, a court would have to calculate the
prospective value of the case if plaintiff were to develop a full-blown case
of the disease, thereby incurring "full" damages, and then discount that
amount by the chances that she would not in fact contract the disease and
that whatever disease she did contract was the result of factors other than
defendant's misconduct.38 Failure to provide a discount would result in
35. Judges nearly uniformly expressed concern about allowing speculative claims to be
brought before a plaintiff had suffered real harm because allowing such claims might flood
the courts with inherently speculative claims and leave defendants without sufficient re-
sources to pay damages to seriously injured plaintiffs who, after the long incubation period
that frequently attends toxic exposures, finally develop illness and need compensation
from the depleted resources of the tortfeasor who loosed the toxin in the first place. In the
asbestos area, before courts abolished the single action rule that precluded later suit if one
had already sued for some damages earlier, a few early cases allowed enhanced risk claims
for people who suffered minor exposures (including not only asymptomatic pleural plaque
or thickening, but also asbestos). See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 819-21. But
once the courts rejected the single action rule and allowed plaintiffs to sue for serious
illnesses-such as mesothelioma or some other virulent form of cancer-as they became
diagnosable, the courts flatly rejected enhanced risk claims. Id. at 822-23 and cases cited
therein at n.27.
Outside the asbestos area, those courts that considered enhanced risk claims indicated
serious reservations about them, either forbidding them entirely or limiting recovery in
them to the narrow range of cases in which plaintiff could demonstrate that her risk was so
high that she would almost certainly contract the serious disease that threatened her. The
reluctance to allow enhanced risk claims to proceed has been demonstrated by courts that
have looked favorably on emotional distress and medical monitoring claims, indicating
that, of the three types of claims, the ones seeking damages for being put at risk of disease
are by far the least attractive. Compare, Burns, 752 P.2d at 28 and Potter, 863 P.2d at 795
and Ayers, 525 A.2d at 287.
36. See supra notes 31, 35 and cases cited therein.
37. See Herber v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1986); Pierce, Recov-
ery for Increased Risk in Developing a Future Injury from Exposure to a Toxic Substance,
19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 256 (1989).
38. See Kalas, supra note 15, at 135; David S. Pregno, Note, An Analysis of the En-
hanced Risk Cause of Action (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Toxic Waste),
33 VILL. L. REV. 437, 438 (1988).
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gross over-deterrence because it would impose on a defendant a duty to
provide compensation for deaths and illnesses that could not be fairly
attributable to its own conduct.39 Under traditional doctrine, of course,
such claims fail where physical injury has not yet been realized.
There are several reasons why the courts' refusal to permit enhanced
risk claims has been wise. First, allowing such claims would result in seri-
ous statute of limitations problems. When, after all, would the cause of
action accrue-when plaintiff discovered her risk of injury had been in-
creased, or when she became sick? Determination that the tort claim
does not accrue until disease becomes symptomatic and implementation
of a discovery rule have provided some relief in the toxic tort cases,
though these do not fully take care of the problem of statutes of repose or
the difficulties of proving causation when disease arises long after the
tortious activity has come to an end.40 Putting those matters aside, there
is the problem of the single action rule, which historically would have
prevented plaintiff from bringing two actions for damages arising out of
the same wrongful conduct. The courts have rightly disposed of the single
action rule in the asbestos cases, allowing a plaintiff to sue first for minor
illnesses and then later upon the onset of more serious diseases like can-
cer,41 and there is reason to believe that they might refuse to enforce the
rule in cases where a plaintiff first sues for separate losses, such as medi-
cal monitoring expenses, and then later sues for disease, should that ulti-
mately occur.42 But virtually no courts would allow the same plaintiff to
39. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 858-59 (1984) ("to hold a defendant
firm accountable not only for disease losses caused by its own tortious conduct, but also for
those attributable to background risk, might inflict a 'crushing liability"') (footnote omit-
ted). Professor Rosenberg is one of the few writers to argue for some sort of mechanism
for making tortfeasors responsible for enhancing victims' likelihood of disease prior to
injury. The "public law" article proposes, in the interest of assuring perfect levels of deter-
rence for mass toxic tort cases, creation of an elaborate insurance mechanism whereby
defendant would have to provide an insurance fund (which later could be distributed
among the victims according to principles of insurability), the amount of which would be
precisely determined by figuring out the gross value of disease the whole class of victims
will suffer discounted by the degree to which such disease would be fairly attributable to
background factors or other tortfeasors. He was very clear that liability should be awarded
regardless of whether disease attributable to defendant's misconduct was more or less than
half the total cause of disease. Id. at 859-60. In later writing, Professor Rosenberg has
adhered to the same position. See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compen-
sation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002).
40. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
41. See Blumenberg, supra note 28, at 669-70 and authorities cited therein at n.40;
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 819-24.
42. See Kara L. McCall, Comment, Medical Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent
Claims for Disease, 66 U. CHi. L. REV. 969 (1999). As McCall notes, the dangers associ-
ated with abrogation of the single action rule are not present in the monitoring case: "A
court permitting medical monitoring damages expressly decides not to compensate for fu-
ture injury but instead to compensate only for the cost of monitoring. Therefore, when a
medical monitoring plaintiff brings a second claim, there is no risk of double recovery." Id.
at 987 (footnotes omitted). While there are few cases dealing with the issue, most (but not
all) of the cases suggest by way of dictum that the single action rule would not be enforced
in the monitoring cases. Accord Pankaj Venugopal, Note, The Class Certification of Medi-
cal Monitoring Claims, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1674-75 (2002) [hereinafter Venugopal].
[Vol. 58
Medical Monitoring Without Physical Injury
recover twice, once for enhanced risk and later for damages associated
with full-blown disease. Allowing her to recover again could force the
defendant to pay twice, first for her discounted loss, then again for much
of the same loss when plaintiff sued for the later recovery; 43 such actions
would be inefficient and lead to overdeterrence of those participating in
the defendant's industry because defendants would end up paying not
only full damages for those who came down sick, but also partial damages
for those who were exposed but never actually became ill.44 And should
the courts allow the plaintiffs a choice to sue now for enhanced risk or
later for full damages, but not both, plaintiffs would rightly be chary of
taking advantage of the right to sue early and would do so only where the
chances of real illness were extremely remote.45 Courts are rightly wary
of encouraging a flood of expensive litigation that would divert judicial
resources from efficiently handling the claims of more seriously injured
plaintiffs who have suffered real harm at the hands of a business or gov-
ernmental actor.
Moreover, the management of enhanced risk claims, particularly with
avoiding speculation regarding proof of causation and calculation of dam-
ages, would prove a difficult and expensive task. First, the courts would
have to measure the future "value" of a disease not yet contracted. One
can imagine a court attempting to accomplish this by averaging out the
results of a few test cases, 46 but one must realize the prospects for success
in choosing the proper figure and then working out the value of a particu-
There is scant scholarly opinion in opposition to this view, but here and there one finds an
article indicating the possibility that res judicata might preclude a second action. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1079 ("a medical monitoring award could preclude plaintiffs
from seeking additional damages if and when they actually develop a disease...").
There is almost no judicial authority; outside the asbestos area, on the issue McCall,
Venugopal and Schwartz address. What reported authority exists is dictum. A number of
courts have suggested that the single action rule should not bar a subsequent action for
damages. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1986),
modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 300
(N.J. 1987). On the other hand, at least one court has suggested it would be inclined to bar
a second action. See Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 858-59 (Ky. 2002).
43. See supra note 42, and authorities cited therein.
44. Even if the court allowed a second action and gave the defendant a set-off for
those who it had paid discounted damages, to the extent of what had been paid, the result
would involve a multiplicity of actions and would be inefficient, at least to the extent the
defendant had to pay people who did not get sick.
45. If the court allowed plaintiffs to sue now or sue later, but not both, a conscientious
plaintiff's lawyer would have difficulty counseling her client to sue for enhanced risk dam-
ages if she really believed there was a serious likelihood that the client would ultimately
contract the disease. So advising a client would in many cases result in leaving the seri-
ously ill tort victim undercompensated unless she was able to show that her lawyer had
engaged in malpractice in failing to warn her of the consequences involved in choosing the
enhanced risk claim in the first place. In all likelihood, plaintiffs' lawyers would counsel
their clients to sue for enhanced risk only in those cases where the chances of actually
contracting the disease or showing that it was caused by defendant's misconduct was ex-
tremely improbable.
46. See George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases: Deterrence, Compensa-
tion, and Necessity, 88 VA. L. REv. 1989, 1993-94 (2002). For other articles suggesting
either waiting for an appropriate sample of cases to be litigated or settled or creating such
a sample from claims of class members, see authorities listed id. at 1994 n.16.
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lar plaintiff's losses are not good. Figuring out a generalized "value" for
measuring the gross damages that contracting the disease would involve
should be daunting enough. But the speculatory nature of this endeavor
pales in comparison to that of determining what discount rate the court
ought to employ so as not to make a defendant responsible for all the
background risks that might have caused a particular plaintiff's loss. This,
of course, involves proof of causation in fact: to what extent would the
disease in question be caused by defendant's conduct and not by some
extraneous events or conditions? The evidence of that strict proof of cau-
sation is all but impossible.47
47. Causation problems arise with respect both to general causation (for example, a
product's generalized ability to cause harm to a wide population) and individualized or
specific causation (that is, the likelihood that a specific exposure caused-or will cause-
injury to a specific plaintiff, given his own peculiar medical history, exposure to other prod-
ucts, etc.). See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Your Products Liability Hit Parade: A Class Torts
"Top 20", 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 169, 213-14 (2001). Generally, nobody understands the
mechanism through which toxins may cause a given disease, which means that even when a
person is diagnosed, it is possible to conclusively attribute the illness to a particular toxin
only in those rare cases where the disease is seen as a "signature disease"-diseases which
are clearly the exception, not the rule. See Troyen Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic
Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scien-
tific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1989). More com-
monly, since there is usually no way to directly and scientifically link a particular toxic
exposure to a particular onset of disease, the linkage must be proven inferentially, through
use of epidemiological studies and other scientific data-animal studies, laboratory studies,
etc.-that may shed light on the toxicity of a particular product. Unfortunately, for the
wide range of toxins, there are precious few epidemiological studies indicating precisely
what the chances of contracting disease will be. And what numbers there are rarely can
account for the fact that different plaintiffs may have had different levels of exposure to
the toxins and that each plaintiff may have a history of other health factors that would
complicate determination of the extent to which his particular exposure may have in-
creased his likelihood of disease. In addition to these problems, there often is the difficulty
of actually ascertaining the level of exposure particular plaintiffs may have suffered many
years previous to the onset of symptoms and their decision to bring suit, as well as the
difficulty of determining whether and to what extent over that period plaintiffs may have
been exposed to other factors that could have contributed to their chances of contracting
whatever disease is in question. These problems are difficult enough in a single-plaintiff
case, but they are multiplied a hundred-fold in complex litigation involving sometimes hun-
dreds of plaintiffs and, in a few cases, multiple defendants.
The legal literature on the difficulties of proving causation is vast. A sample would in-
clude Akim F. Czmus, Medical Monitoring of Toxic Torts, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
35, 45-46, 50-51 (1994) (criticizing judicial decisions requiring precise quantification of ex-
posure levels and increased risk in PCB exposure cases); Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 28,
at 868-74, 921-24 (discussing proof of causation problems in Love Canal disaster); Michael
G. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The
Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 680-82 (1992)
(critiquing decisions that severely limit admissibility of expert testimony to cases where
testimony is based on uncontradicted epidemiological studies) [hereinafter Green]; David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855-59 (1984) (discussing causation proof difficulties in
mass tort cases generally); Slagel, supra note 14, at 853 (cataloguing problems of proof of
causation in toxic tort cases); See also Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988); Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemio-
logical Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429 (1983);
Daniel S. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); Khristine L. Hall & Ellen
K. Sibergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L.
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Plaintiff's lawyers have had modest (perhaps one should say, "un-
derwhelming") success in persuading courts to avoid the physical injury
requirement by allowing plaintiff to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.48 A virtue of the emotional distress claims is that a
plaintiff can at least claim that at the time of suit he has actually suffered
an injury-albeit a nonphysical one. Thus plaintiffs are not claiming
damages because they might get sick in the future; they are claiming that
they are suffering presently.
But the emotional distress claims also run into problems. With rare
exceptions, tort law has refused to allow damages for emotional distress
unless and until the claim is associated with physical injury. 49 There are
many reasons for this view. Most frequently mentioned in the case law is
the fear of fraudulent claims-a plaintiff's claimed injury is internal and
open to her own self-serving testimony-as well as a sense that there are
no objective standards for giving monetary valuation to whatever psycho-
logical harm a plaintiff may concededly suffer.50 Less frequently men-
tioned are normative concerns.51 Emotional peace is impossible in a
REV. 441 (1983); Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to
the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 189 (1993).
48. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 31-35 and cases cited therein. The reluctance of courts to openly
embrace wide-ranging claims of damages for negligently inflicted emotional harm reflects a
fear that doing so will open the floodgates to fraudulent or frivolous litigation. See gener-
ally DAN D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 308 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 360 (5th ed. 1984). This reluctance has meant that in
the instances where courts relax the physical injury requirement, they require that there be
a direct, immediate threat of physical harm to plaintiff or at least a threat of major, objec-
tively overwhelming trauma to plaintiff's psyche. It seems safe to say that the cases up-
holding claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress never meant to provide
compensation for general malaise and fear that one may contract a disease sometime in the
future. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 827.
50. Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521
U.S. 424, 443 (1997), quoted infra at note 82, expressed this view most succinctly and
clearly.
51. A few cases mention such normative concerns. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 810 n.12 (1993); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975
(Utah 1993). But there is no question that they lurk behind judicial preference for victims
demonstrating physical injury over those with less tangible illnesses. Goldberg and Zipur-
sky suggest that the historic reason courts forbade recovery for emotional distress unless it
was a consequence of physical injury was that the
nineteenth-century judges who first elaborated the modern law of negligence
labored under various pre-modern misconceptions about science and nature
that led them to discount emotional injury as insubstantial or unreal. Moreo-
ver, their illusions were tied to a generally sexist disposition. Emotional dis-
tress was, to their eyes, the sort of thing that women, in all their delicacy,
experienced. As women's interests were, at the time, of little concern to the
law, emotional distress was not either.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1668-69. After conceding that the line against
claims for "pure" emotional harm (i.e., that unaccompanied by physical injury) has been
substantially held for practical reasons involving fear of fake claims, hard to value claims,
and the like, the authors note that these concerns could be addressed by requirements of
heightened proof. See id. at 1670-71. In the authors' view, the reason the law continues to
impose narrow limits on emotional distress claims involves a normative view that at least a
large part of plaintiff's harm may often result from plaintiff's own weakness and not be the
proximate result of defendant's breach of duty. Id. at 1675-76. In their view, hostility to
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world where people are likely to interact and rub against one another,
and there is a very American notion that, by-and-large, the law should
hold people responsible for their own psychological well-being rather
than promote litigation through which they can blame their unhappiness
on others and receive generous compensation therefor. This fear-that
in many cases some or all of a plaintiff's stress might involve an inappro-
priate response to threats that are simply part of the wear and tear of
everyday life-has led many courts to be extremely reluctant to allow
recovery for infliction of emotional distress, lest doing so should open the
judicial floodgates to a sea of weak, sometimes faked, sometimes simply
neurotic, claims.52
III. SUCCESS OF MOVEMENT TO PERMIT CLAIMS FOR
MEDICAL MONITORING
Prosecutors of medical monitoring claims met far more success than
those of enhanced risk or emotional distress. The cases favoring medical
monitoring got around the injury requirement by defining the injury as
economic: the tortious conduct that had put the plaintiff at risk of future
death or serious bodily harm had forced upon her the medical necessity
of undergoing expensive periodic medical screening to gain the benefits
of early detection of disease so as to prevent premature death or to miti-
gate serious illness; a defendant, having imposed this medical necessity on
a plaintiff, ought to be required to pay for it. 3 Decisions upholding med-
ical monitoring relief often contended that the remedy is in the public
interest because it would likely save lives and deter defendants from fail-
ing to avoid exposing the public to dangerous products by preventing
them from shifting the medical screening costs their conduct has imposed
plaintiff's claims of emotional distress as likely fraudulent fails when it is applied to cases
of serious and likely fear, as might be the case with substantial exposure to a carcinogen,
and certainly does not explain why a victim of such a harm should be left without a remedy
when a person claiming much more amorphous harms (e.g., pain and suffering), without
much in the way of elaboration should be awarded large sums of money if she suffered a
physical harm. But, they argue, the law's "focus on the subjectivity of emotional dis-
tress ... points to a different and more plausible concern that does help explain negligence
law's suspicion of emotional harm claims: Emotional harm is often, though not always, in
the control of, and therefore the responsibility of, the victim." Id. at 1677.
52. Concern about the floodgates is real. The Supreme Court indicated this concern in
Buckley, 521 U.S. at 435-36, discussed infra at notes 70-98 and accompanying text; see also
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994), upon which Buckley relied. Scholarly
writing evidences similar concerns. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 18, at 1934 (arguing
generally that tort law gives higher priority to compensate for physical injury than it does
for emotional distress, not so much as to protect defendants or because it devalues emo-
tional injury per se, but principally in order to prioritize cases to assure that a defendant's
resources are conserved so as to give physically injured plaintiffs a much higher chance of
receiving full compensation); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 832-35 (discussing
emotional distress claims in asbestos-exposure cases).
53. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990); Potter,
863 P.2d at 824; Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311-12 (N.J. 1987); Askey v.
Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Hansen, 858 P.2d at
976.
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on innocent victims. 54 The decisions point out that granting medical
monitoring relief without physical injury would at least provide partial
accountability for tortfeasors who might otherwise avoid having to pay
because the lengthy period of time between initial defendant activity and
manifestation of plaintiff's illness often forces a tort victim to sue too late,
outside statutory time limits on bringing suit; even without a time bar on
litigation, they noted that delay in discovery of one's claim not infre-
quently undermined the plaintiffs' ability to prove causation and made it
difficult, if not impossible, to hold many defendants responsible for their
misdeeds. 55 Finally, the cases pointed out that it was simply inequitable
for an individual, wrongfully exposed to dangerous products or toxic
chemicals but unable to prove that disease is likely, to have to pay his
own expenses when a doctor would not have required him to undergo
those expenses but for the defendant's misconduct. 56 As one court put it,
holding the defendant liable is simply consistent with basic "societal no-
tions of fairness and elemental justice." 57
The cases upholding medical monitoring prior to physical injury differ
among themselves regarding precisely when monitoring relief should be
permitted. While there are many differences in detail, perhaps the most
significant involve the degree to which a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin is
necessary to force a defendant to underwrite medical monitoring costs.
The most liberal cases focus on the economic harm the victim will sustain
because the defendant has pushed her into a class of persons whose his-
tory warrants, according to current medical standards, regular screening
for one or more diseases that would not have been deemed advisable
prior to her exposure to defendant's product. These courts would not
limit liability for these costs to cases in which a defendant would be liable
for the plaintiff's illness should it later develop. Instead, they would au-
thorize medical monitoring when a variety of factors, considered in the
aggregate, warrant mandating a medical monitoring regime.
58
54. See, e.g., Potter, 863 P.2d at 824; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311-12; Hansen, 858 P.2d at
977.
55. See, e.g., Burns v. Jacquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987);
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311-12; Hansen, 863 P.2d at 977 n.8.
56. As the Ayers court put it: "It is inequitable for an individual, wrongfully exposed
to dangerous toxic chemicals but unable to prove that disease is likely, to have to pay his
own expenses when medical intervention is clearly reasonable and necessary." 525 A.2d at
312.
57. Potter, 863 P.2d at 824.
58. The factors differ in detail from court to court. In Ayers, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that
the cost of medical surveillance is . . .compensable . . .where the proofs
demonstrate, through reliable expert testimony predicated upon the signifi-
cance and extent of exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the
seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk, the relative in-
crease in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed, and the value of
early diagnosis, that such surveillance to monitor the effect of exposure to
toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary.
525 A.2d at 312.
In Potter, the California Supreme Court said that monitoring relief should be ordered
when the plaintiff showed, through reliable medical testimony, that future medical moni-
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The broad discretion the liberal courts would confer on trial judges to
consider and balance myriad factors is not universally approved by either
writers or courts who claim to approve medical monitoring. As noted
above, a number of writers think the focus on the economic costs a defen-
dant has forced a plaintiff to incur is misplaced unless it is tightly linked
to the enhanced jeopardy a defendant has thrust upon a plaintiff's longev-
ity. They argue that a defendant should be liable for monitoring only in
those cases where a defendant ultimately would be liable for disease
should a plaintiff contract it. In their view, unless a plaintiff can prove
that the courts should not order defendants to pay for a plaintiff's moni-
toring.59 As one writer puts it, recovery should be limited to those cases
in which the plaintiff can demonstrate that the risk of disease after expo-
sure to a defendant's product more than doubles the odds that she will
contract the threatened disease over those odds she would have been sub-
ject to before exposure. 60
toring is a reasonably certain consequence of a plaintiff's toxic exposure and that the rec-
ommended monitoring is reasonable. "In determining the reasonableness and necessity
of' the monitoring proposed, Potter said that the court should consider "(1) the signifi-
cance and extent of plaintiff's exposure; (2) the toxicity of the chemicals; (3) the relative
increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the expo-
sure . . . (4) the seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the
clinical value of early detection and diagnosis." 863 P.2d at 824-25.
In Paoli, the Third Circuit came up with a four point test, mandating that plaintiff prove
that
(1) she was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through
the negligent actions of the defendant; (2) [a]s a proximate result of expo-
sure, plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious
latent disease; (3) [t]hat increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical ex-
aminations reasonably necessary; [and] (4) [m]onitoring and testing proce-
dures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease
possible and beneficial.
916 F.2d at 852.
Other courts numbered their tests differently. See, e.g., Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (eight
point test); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988)(three point test). Whatever version the courts favoring medical monitoring used, most of
them have authorized medical monitoring on the basis of judicial discretion using a similar
list of factors.
59. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. My research has failed to find a single
case expressly adopting the view taken by Klein and Hamrick in the articles cited supra
note 26. But many of the cases upholding monitoring relief are consistent with it. This was
true from the start. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816(D.C. Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 11, was a case in which the conditions Klein and
Hamrick would set for monitoring would have been found to exist; if the children came
down with the neurological damage that threatened them, there is no question that it
would have been attributable to the decompression and crash of the aircraft in which they
were passengers. A similar analysis would follow in many cases. See, for example, Doe v.
City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1997), wherein the court upheld medical monitoring
for a plaintiff who had been exposed to a person carrying the AIDS virus as well as tuber-
culosis. Moreover, many of the medical monitoring cases speak of monitoring payments as
simply a means of assuring full recovery of consequential damages suffered as a result of
defendant's tort. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir.
1986); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Askey, 477
N.Y.S.2d at 247. It is logical to conclude that, at least to the extent that these cases rely on
that theory, they are really taking the same view as Klein, which is to say, absent free-
standing tort liability for disease, medical expenses should not be compensable.
60. Klein, supra note 21.
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Yet a third group of cases goes much further toward limiting medical
monitoring relief-virtually to the point of prohibiting it. In their view,
such relief should be awarded only in those cases in which there is a rea-
sonable medical certainty that the defendant's toxic product will in fact
ultimately cause the plaintiff to come down with the disease.61 For these
courts, the injury is not the medical costs at all, but the threat of physical
harm that hangs over the plaintiff. To take care of that, it suffices that a
defendant take steps to mitigate the future losses a plaintiff has been able
to prove he will probably have because of a defendant's misconduct.
Virtually all the courts permitting medical monitoring relief absent
physical injury do so only when the state of current medical diagnostic
tools and interventions are such that providing monitoring substantially
increases the likelihood of reduction of long-term serious medical harm
to the victim. A minority go further, indicating a willingness to provide
monitoring relief even if early medical intervention would have no signifi-
cant efficacy other than to give the victim advanced warning that she was
in for a long-term illness, thus enabling her to make plans for the inevita-
ble outcome. 62 The difference between these views may be quite sub-
stantial.63 The more lax view seems to allow medical monitoring solely to
provide solace to the victim, thus avoiding any real attempt to show that
whatever monitoring regime is ordered has real promise of changing the
clinical outcomes for people suffering exposure to toxic substances.
64
Cases favoring medical monitoring often distinguished such claims
from those for negligent infliction of emotional distress or enhanced risk
of future harm. The courts allowing medical monitoring claims where no
physical injury has yet been inflicted were able to avoid many of the diffi-
culties that would flow from allowing suits based on the other "unrealized
tort" theories. They were able effectively to argue that there was nothing
unreal or speculative about the monitoring costs plaintiffs must suffer as a
result of a defendant's toxins.65 Thus, medical monitoring claims favora-
61. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 146 n.8 (Pa.
1997); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 434 (W. Va. 1999), both of
which are discussed supra note 30.
63. One must be careful not to overstate the difference between these two views. The
more lax view treats improving patient morale and quality of life as sufficient to tip the
scales in favor of monitoring, while the tighter view requires substantial improvement in
mortality or morbidity before it would permit monitoring. The cases conditioning monitor-
ing relief on proof of the clinical efficacy of monitoring rarely mention issues involving
general improvement of quality of life for a terminal patient, so it cannot be said that the
courts are placing that factor on the scales when they authorize balancing factors to deter-
mine whether surveillance should be ordered. Nevertheless, one would be hard pressed to
deny that at least a side effect of any monitoring regime aimed at improving longevity
would be to improve the psychological and social life of the person being monitored.
64. In allowing medical monitoring in the absence of a showing that early detection
would likely alleviate physical harm, the courts permitting it do say that a reason for al-
lowing it now is that in the future new treatments may be developed that will permit treat-
ment of previously untreatable diseases. Such speculations seem a weak reed indeed to
use to support the cost of medical monitoring.
65. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d at 852; Potter, 863 P.2d at 824;
Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 359 n.12 (La. 1998).
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bly compared to those based on emotional distress and enhanced risk
theories, which courts generally refused precisely because they were seen
as speculative, likely to open the floodgates of litigation, and, at the end
of the day, threaten to bankrupt defendants before the most seriously
injured victims of their torts developed serious illness warranting substan-
tial damages. 66 Unlike enhanced risk claims, here a plaintiff is alleged to
have suffered present injury-the economic harm of having to undergo
tests needed to assure early detection so that she can save her life. This
"injury" results directly from a defendant's misconduct, the argument
runs, because a plaintiff would have no need of undergoing the tests-
and paying their costs-but for the fact that the defendant's misconduct
has now put her in a risk category for which her doctor, exercising rea-
sonable medical judgment under current medical standards, now recom-
mends the testing regime as necessary to her wellness. Furthermore,
there is no problem of double damages or lack of efficiency. Instead, the
defendants' payout to finance medical screening expenses they have
forced upon those exposed to their toxic products is likely to deter mis-
conduct by making defendants responsible for all the costs their miscon-
duct causes, because it forces them to cover not only for the illnesses they
cause but also for the additional healthcare costs their conduct would oth-
erwise foist on other innocent victims who would have to pay in order to
protect themselves against threatened death or sickness. An added boon
is that, if the exposure defendants have wrongfully threatened plaintiffs
with what in fact ultimately does cause the plaintiffs' harm, at least the
monitoring relief financed by defendants will help to mitigate the plain-
tiffs' damages. If the plaintiffs then follow the regimen to the extent au-
thorized by the court, presumably lives will be saved and the defendants'
ultimate costs will be lowered; if the plaintiffs were to refuse to undergo
the screening services offered to them by defendants, then the defend-
ants' lawyers would be in a strong position to shift at least some responsi-
bility for ultimate liability through doctrines of assumption of the risk,
contributory negligence or avoidable consequences.
Medical monitoring claims also avoid many of the problems of litiga-
tion management that attend enhanced-risk claims. In the medical moni-
toring context, a court still must evaluate the extent to which a
defendant's tort has substantially increased a plaintiff's absolute and rela-
tive risk of contracting disease above levels that are part of everyday life
or which are peculiar to a plaintiff because of idiosyncratic factors relat-
ing to the plaintiff's own life experience. 67 However, problems of proof
66. See cases cited supra notes 32, 35 and accompanying text.
67. It is important to realize that any serious risk assessment must involve evaluation
of risk in both its absolute and relative senses. The distinction is succinctly explained by
Abraham:
A significant increase requirement is designed to ensure that medical moni-
toring will be worthwhile. First, we are all exposed to a wide variety of risks
in our lives; unless an increase of risk raises the threat faced by the plaintiff
to a significant level, it is not an appropriate occasion for monitoring in order
to mitigate possible future loss. Thus, the risk must be significant in an "ab-
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are dwarfed in comparison to the difficulties of determining causation
and damages that would necessarily attend any serious attempt to resolve
enhanced risk claims.68 With respect to the latter, the task of measuring
what the mean "value" of disease and then applying a proper discount
rate would be daunting indeed.69 Medical screening costs, while they
could go up or down as medical knowledge and techniques advance, are
comparatively concrete and predictable. However, the need for mathe-
matical precision in determining just how much defendant's actions have
increased the likelihood of a particular illness in the claimant is cut short
if the issue is not whether defendant has more probably than not caused
plaintiff to contract a disease, but is instead simply whether a reasonable
solute" sense. Second, the very idea of an "increase" of risk presupposes a
baseline-some background risk of suffering harm against which the change
in risk level brought about by the defendant's conduct can be measured. The
less "significant" that increase is, the less likely any harm that does material-
ize was in fact caused by the defendant's conduct. So the risk must also be
significant in the "relative" sense.
Abraham, supra note 18, at 1979-80.
68. The reason for this is that most courts favoring medical monitoring have not re-
quired plaintiffs to "quantify" the level of risk with the same kind of statistics that are
necessary to prove an enhanced risk claim. Instead, they have sustained claims when plain-
tiffs prove increase in risk of a "significant," "serious," or "substantial" nature, without
requiring its precise quantification. This refusal to require quantification of risk has driven
critics of medical monitoring to distraction. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16,
at 844-45 (effect of discharged toxins around world on risk levels at best speculative so as
to leave no natural boundaries on duty to pay medical monitoring costs); Klein, supra note
21, at 18 (awarding medical monitoring damages without regard to a quantifiable enhanced
risk standard "completely destroy[s]" causation rule of tort law); Schwartz, supra note 19,
at 1072 (need for legislation to avoid current "'battle of the experts' to determine the
'confusing, highly technical presentation of scientific evidence in toxic tort cases .... [that]
can lead factfinders astray by tangling them in a web of statistical uncertainties and stan-
dards of persuasion."'); Hamrick, supra note 26, at 476 (demanding more probable than
not standard). One writer takes a dim view of even quantified risk, arguing that even if
risk is quantified, it is likely to be proven "by way of linear extrapolation from high-dose
rodent studies using [Environmental Protection Agency] risk assessment techniques that
are specifically designed to greatly overstate the risk." Goutman, supra, note 20, at 31.
Those writers satisfied with a clearly quantified standard sometimes appear satisfied if
there is either quantification or some other "objective" definition of what constitutes an
unacceptable exposure to a toxin so as to create a definite "trigger" that would be the
principal way of determining when medical monitoring relief is appropriate. They claim
that failure to set such requirements will lead to unprincipled decision-making and open
the floodgates in ways that lead to gross overdeterrence of worthwhile projects. For rec-
ommendations of objective "triggers," see, for example, Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1077
(recommending legislation along lines of regulations issued pursuant to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq, which sets limits for hazardous substance
exposures in workplaces and provides for surveillance procedures to determine whether
workplaces have exceeded those limits); see also Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts,
46 VAND. L. REv. 1, 69 (1993) (same) [hereinafter Brennan]; Klein, supra note 21, at 17;
George W. C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical
Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 275 (1993) [herein-
after McCarter] (recommending use of admittedly conservative medical surveillance guide-
lines recommended by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health but rejecting
standards set by EPA as heedlessly overbroad). Hamrick, supra note 26, at 476 (recom-
mending limiting recovery only to those exposed to "significant concentrations" of one or
more of the fifty most toxic chemicals as designated by the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry).
69. See, e.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312.
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physician would find medical monitoring reasonable and necessary under
the new circumstances created by plaintiff's exposure to defendant's
toxin.70
IV. METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY
V. BUCKLEY
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court refused to permit medical
monitoring damages relief in an action filed under the Federal Employees
Liability Act ("FELA").71 The decision, Metro-North Commuter Rail-
road Co. v. Buckley,72 cast doubt on developments in the field during the
previous decade and may have caused a partial stall in the movement
among lower courts to adopt a cause of action allowing medical monitor-
ing relief prior to the time the illness clinically manifests itself.73
70. According to the Ayers decision, there is little need to quantify risk in the monitor-
ing cases precisely because, unlike a claim for enhanced risk, which would of course re-
quire proof of likelihood, extent, and monetary value, the medical surveillance claim seeks
reimbursement for specific dollar costs of periodic examinations that are medically neces-
sary regardless of the fact that it is unknown whether plaintiff will ultimately get sick. Id.
Accord In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d at 852; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rub-ber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993). Many scholars concur. See, e.g., Blumenberg, supra
note 28, at 675; Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and
the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 275 (1988); Kalas, supra note 15, at 135-36; Jesse R. Lee, Medical
Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning the Administration of Medical Monitoring Pro-
gram, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 251, 263 (1994).
71. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). Prior to Buck-ley, the trend, from Ayers through Paoli and down to Potter and Hansen, had been over-
whelmingly in favor of allowing monitoring relief prior to the infliction of actual physicalinjury. Prior to Buckley, several lower court decisions bucked the trend, the most signifi-
cant of which was Ball v. Joy Tech., Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991) which denied monitor-ing relief under Virginia and West Virginia law because plaintiff had suffered no physicalinjury. See also Purjet v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., No. 1985/284, 1986 WL 1200 (D.V.I. Jan. 8,1996); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984). The Buckley court held
that the FELA did not authorize creating a pre-physical injury cause of action for damages
for medical monitoring and reserved for future consideration whether any kind of pre-injury monitoring relief might be permissible under the statute. 521 U.S. at 443-44.
72. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
73. While not binding on state courts in defining state causes of action, the Buckleydecision was inevitably going to be given due consideration by state and federal courts indefining whether and under what circumstances a right to medical monitoring relief shouldbe recognized. In the wake of the Buckley decision, a number of courts have declined to
create state causes of action for pre-injury monitoring. See, e.g., Duncan v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (no monitoring relief absent physical
injury); Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831-32 (Ala. 2001) (same); Wood v. Wy-
eth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002) (same); Badillo v. Am. Brands, 16 P.3d
435, 440 (Nev. 2001) (refusing to create cause of action for medical monitoring, but reserv-ing question whether monitoring might be appropriate remedy in actions based on one or
more substantive theories, including negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, etc.).Others have indicated doubt as to whether medical monitoring relief is appropriate in the
absence of physical injury. See, e.g., Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 963 (8th Cir.2000) (predicting Nebraska would reject claim). Cases like these have led critics of medi-
cal monitoring to conclude that although Buckley did not stop the trend in favor of creating
a right to monitoring relief prior to actual physical injury, it certainly slowed it down. See,
e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 838-41; Klein, supra note 21, at 3 (The Buck-
ley decision "places the 'tort' of medical monitoring at a crossroad.").
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The Buckley case presented a claim by a railroad employee who had
been exposed to asbestos for approximately one hour per working day
over a three year period, from 1985 into 1988.74 After attending an "as-
bestos awareness class" in 1987, the plaintiff became fearful of con-
tracting cancer or some other asbestos-related disease and, in 1989,
undertook a regime of periodic medical check-ups for cancer and asbes-
tos-related disease. 75 The plaintiff then initiated a negligence action
against the railroad, asking the court to order the defendant to make a
lump sum damages award to cover his medical monitoring costs, defining
those costs as the reasonable value of such medical regime that "a reason-
able physician would prescribe .. . [over and above what] 'would have
been prescribed"' had the defendant never negligently exposed plaintiff
to the asbestos.76 In Buckley, the district court noted that plaintiff had
failed to allege that he had suffered any physical impact or injury and
dismissed his action.77 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
Buckley could recover for the costs of medical check-ups because the
FELA permits recovery of all reasonably incurred extra medical
monitoring costs whenever a "reasonable physician would pre-
scribe . . . a monitoring regime different than the one that would
have been prescribed in the absence of' a particular negligently
caused exposure to a toxic substance.78
A divided Supreme Court reversed. 79
Justice Breyer's majority opinion assumed that plaintiff would have
been able to recover for both emotional distress and medical monitoring
While Buckley may have slowed the medical monitoring movement, it did not stop it. A
number of courts read the decision narrowly and refused to conclude that it forbids medi-
cal monitoring claims, even in cases governed by federal law in which the FELA rules
normally would have to apply. See, e.g., In re Marine Asbestos Cases, 265 F.3d 861 (9th
Cir. 2001) (Jones Act case forbidding medical monitoring because of plaintiff's failures of
proof, but holding it is an open question whether Buckley permits limited order creating
court-supervised fund for monitoring relief in absence of physical injury); Dragon v.
Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 726 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Jones Act case
claiming non-lump sum monitoring relief not forbidden by Buckley and upholding same).
Still other courts that have been called to set out a position under state law-decisions as to
which they are not bound by Buckley-have flatly refused to follow it. See, e.g., Carey v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Illinois law); Bour-
geois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
74. Buckley, 521 U.S. at 427.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id. at 428.
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. The majority opinion was written by Justice Breyer. Justice Ginsburg joined by
Justice Stevens, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The second
opinion agreed with the majority that plaintiff's claim for damages for emotional distress
should fail, though not on account of the physical injury rule, but instead on the basis that
the plaintiff had failed to prove emotional harm of sufficient seriousness to warrant dam-
ages relief. Id. at 444-45. On the medical monitoring issue, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens
disagreed with the majority and argued that the Second Circuit's determination to award
relief to the plaintiff on that theory should have been affirmed. Id. at 446.
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if and when he developed symptoms. 80 While acknowledging that emo-
tional distress damages are sometimes available in narrow and particular-
ized circumstances, the Court nevertheless pointed out that the
overwhelming majority rule is that non-intentionally inflicted distress, un-
accompanied by physical impact or harm, is not compensable. 81 The
Court noted three reasons for this position: "(a) special 'difficulty forjudges and juries' in separating valid, important claims from those that
are invalid or 'trivial,' (b) a threat of 'unlimited and unpredictable liabil-
ity,' and (c) the 'potential for a flood' of comparatively unimportant...
claims." 82
As for medical monitoring, the Court acknowledged that the claimed
injury was the economic cost of extra medical checkups plaintiff would
have to undergo because of his exposure to the defendant's toxin.83 But
the Court balked at creating a "traditional, full-blown ordinary tort liabil-
ity rule" allowing plaintiff a lump-sum damages award to cover such fu-
ture costs. 84 The Court offered several reasons for this reluctance. First,
it noted that the vagaries of current scientific knowledge would make it
difficult for judges and juries to evaluate the necessity and cost of future
medical monitoring mechanisms. 85 Second, it expressed concern about
the enormous breadth of toxic exposures in the country as well as the cost
80. Id. at 430, 438. Based on Buckley's facts, the assumptions of the majority opinion
were quite generous to the plaintiff. First, prior to instituting the lawsuit, the plaintiff had
smoked cigarettes at a rate of one pack per day over a fifteen year period. The Court
indicated that his exposure to defendant's asbestos "created an added risk of death due to
cancer of" one to three percent or one to five percent, depending on which of his own
experts the trier of fact chose to believe. Id. at 427 (emphasis in original). This fact seri-
ously undermines the claim that his need for medical monitoring was real or had been
substantially caused by Metro-North's behavior.
Second, there was no evidence in the record to indicate that Buckley suffered severe
emotional distress as a result of his exposure. He offered no expert testimony to supporthis claim of emotional distress, and he had in fact never sought professional help to ease
whatever psychological troubles he claimed to suffer from; indeed, the only evidence of
emotional distress in the record was his own self-serving testimony that he was angry atMetro-North for exposing him to asbestos and was fearful of contracting cancer in the
future. These facts led Justice Ginsburg and Stevens to conclude that he failed to prove
emotional injury sufficient to warrant damages for emotional distress. See id. at 445.
In sum, given the objective weakness of the added threat to his health and his failure to
put on any real evidence of emotional distress, one could argue that, even if he had provenphysical injury, a court would have been hard pressed to find that his exposure justified
awarding damages to cover added medical monitoring or emotional disorder resulting
from the injury he claimed to have sustained.
81. Id. at 429-30. The Court acknowledged the existence of facts other than physicalimpact that some courts have used to justify awarding damages for negligently inflicted
emotional distress. The Court explicitly noted the willingness of some courts to permit
recovery for distress suffered by a close relative who has witnessed the physical injury of a
negligence victim as well as to allow damages to those who have suffered an immediate risk
of physical harm by negligent conduct. Id. at 430.
82. Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 439. Later in the opinion, Justice Breyer acknowledged that as an important
consideration in determining whether any kind of monitoring relief should be granted, "it
is inequitable to place the economic burden of [medical screening] on the negligently ex-
posed plaintiff rather than on the negligent defendant." Id. at 443.
84. Id. at 442.
85. Id. at 441-42.
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of monitoring for disease caused by such exposures. 86 These facts made
the court wary of opening the door to a "'flood' of less important cases
(potentially absorbing resources better left available to those more seri-
ously harmed. . . .).-87 Finally, it noted that such a remedy would ignore
the presence of collateral sources of payment, "thereby leaving a court
uncertain about how much of the potentially large recoveries would pay
for otherwise unavailable medical testing and how much would accrue to
plaintiffs for whom employers or other sources ... might provide moni-
toring in any event."'88
The Court acknowledged that cases favoring medical monitoring pre-
sent important competing policy considerations. Among those noted
were the inequity of placing the burden of screening on the innocent vic-
tim rather than the negligent defendant, and the potential public health
impact of mitigating serious future impact of toxic exposures by facilitat-
ing early detection and treatment of the diseases made more likely by
such exposures. 89
Recognizing that various courts had divided over what kind of relief to
order in monitoring cases, the Court noted that most cases authorizing
recovery did "not endorse a full-blown, traditional tort law cause of ac-
tion for lump-sum damages-of the sort that the Court of Appeals seems
to have endorsed here," but instead had "suggested, or imposed, special
limitations on that remedy." 9 The opinion found it significant that al-
though the seminal case of Ayers had ordered a lump-sum payment of
damages, that court had also recommended the future creation of a court-
supervised fund to administer court supervised payments. Justice Breyer
went on to note that other courts had recommended or ordered use of an
insurance mechanism, a court-supervised fund, or some other mechanism
for future periodic reimbursement for screening services as they were in-
curred.91 This kind of order not only assures that the monies ordered to
be paid over to plaintiffs will be used to promote their health and not
squandered on other goods and services, 92 but its also permits future ad-
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 442-43.
89. Id. at 443-44. The Court also saw fit to note that, compared to emotional distress,
medical monitoring claims are less speculative, thus making it easier to "separat[e] justified
from unjustified claims." Id.
90. Id. at 440.
91. After quoting various statements of the courts in the leading cases approving med-
ical monitoring, the Court concluded this part of the discussion with the belief "that the
note of caution, the limitations, and the expressed uneasiness with a traditional lump-sum
damages remedy are important, for they suggest a judicial recognition of some of the policy
concerns that have been pointed out to us here." Id. at 441.
92. Those resisting claims for medical monitoring suggest that the primary reason for
avoiding lump-sum awards is precisely this fear that plaintiffs would usually rather spend
whatever they earn from a lawsuit as they see fit rather than spend much of it on medical
testing. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 844; Klein, supra note 21, at 24;
Arvin Maskin, Konrad L. Cailteux & Joanne M. McLaren, Medical Monitoring: A Viable
Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 541 (2000) [hereinafter Maskin]. A number of cases have ex-
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justments of payments, up or down, depending upon whether there is a
material change of circumstances warranting adjustment of the flow of
monies paid out of a defendant's resources for the plaintiff's screening
costs.
93
Given this background, the Court declined to balance the considera-
tions that other courts had wrestled with in deciding whether to provide
medical screening to asymptomatic claimants based on the enhanced risk
and economic costs these risks imposed on them. Rather than even at-
tempt to "balance [the] ... competing considerations [presented by these
cases]," the Court held only that FELA would not support an "unquali-
fied rule of lump-sum damages recovery that is, at least arguably, before
us here." 94
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, pointed out that the relief the plaintiff had
sought merely asked for "'an amount of money' sufficient to 'compen-
sate' him for 'future medical monitoring expenses."' 95 This request made
pressed similar reservations, albeit in a more neutral way. In Ayers, for instance, the New
Jersey Supreme Court suggested monitoring because it "will insure that in future mass-
exposure litigation ... medical-surveillance damages will be paid only to compensate for
medical examinations and tests actually administered, and will encourage plaintiffs to safe-
guard their health by not allowing them the option of spending the money for other pur-
poses." 525 A.2d at 314.
Summing up both views, one commentator explains:
Anyone who has undergone rigorous medical examinations will acknowledge
that they often involve inconvenience, discomfort and some degree of risk.
This suggests two policy considerations: (1) a person will not lightly submit to
such procedures and so should not be lightly compensated for them, and (2)
when such procedures are indeed "medically necessary," a person should be
encouraged to undergo them, despite the associated risk and inconvenience.
To award unrestricted money damages for medical monitoring is to ignore
both considerations.
McCarter, supra note 68, at 255-56.
93. This argument is more nuanced. It essentially treats the duty to pay monitoring
expenses as limited, conditional on ongoing specific equities justifying imposition of the
duty. This is much in the same way that support payments are ordered, terminated, or
modified in family law litigation, depending on the court's consideration of the material
circumstances at the time.
The cases do not specifically speak in terms of the support order analogy, but they come
close. In the Hansen case, for example, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that if a plain-
tiff's screening costs were to fail to exhaust the fund created to pay monitoring expenses,
the remainder should be returned to the defendant. 858 P.2d at 982. The court in Friendsfor All Children, 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984), entered a similar order, requiring that
monies not spent for monitoring expenses be returned to the defendant with interest. Id. at
823 n.10. The Hansen court accepted the common view, supported by the weight of au-
thority, that if there were no test available that would provide a reasonable basis for
achieving early diagnosis of disease, there would be no point in ordering monitoring, but
then it went on to say that should diagnostic testing later become available, the plaintiff
should then be able to demonstrate the effectiveness of the test, and, if the other grounds
for monitoring are met, he should be able to then have the court order monitoring at the
expense of the defendant. 858 P.2d at 979 n.12. This kind of flexible approach to the duty
to pay is perfectly consistent with the support payment model.
A number of writers have tried to explain how monitoring funds would work. See, e.g.,
Blumenberg, supra note 28, at 665-66 (explaining periodic payment approach to dispersing
monitoring funds); McCarter, supra note 68, at 256-62 (explaining benefits of periodic pay-
ments, especially from trust funds, over lump-sum damages).
94. Buckley, 521 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 455.
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it ambiguous whether he wanted money damages or relief in some other
form. According to Justice Ginsburg, the parties had never argued, either
in the courts below or before the Supreme Court, over what form the
remedy should take, but had focused instead on the larger question of
whether a plaintiff's claim for medical monitoring could warrant any re-
lief at all.96 She concluded that the Court's narrow decision to parse the
question presented and to flatly bar only a lump sum damages award for
screening costs was "enigmatic" at best.97
Whatever Buckley decided, of course, is only controlling in FELA and
kindred actions. 98 Nevertheless, it seems fair to assume that many state
courts give heavy weight to what the Supreme Court said there in decid-
96. As she put it, "[N]o party argued in the District Court, the Second Circuit, or even
this Court, that medical monitoring expenses may be recoverable, but not through a lump
sum, only through a court fund. The question aired below was the prime one the Court
obscures: Does Buckley's medical monitoring claim warrant any relief?" Id. at 454-55.
97. Id. at 455. On this point Justice Ginsburg's critique of the majority opinion was
scathing:
As to Buckley's [medical monitoring] claim, however, the Court speaks ten-
tatively. "The respondent in this case [Buckley]," we are told, "has not
shown that he is legally entitled to recover [medical monitoring] costs." "Ar-
guably," the Court explains, Buckley demands an "unqualified rule of lump-
sum damages recovery," a rule for which the Court finds "[in]sufficient sup-
port in the common law." The Court pointedly refrains, however, from "ex-
press[ing] any view.., about the extent to which the FELA might, or might
not, accommodate medical cost recovery rules more finely tailored than "a
rule of [the] unqualified kind." It is not apparent why (or even whether) the
Court reverses the Second Circuit's determination on Buckley's [medical
monitoring] claim. The Court of Appeals held that a medical monitoring
claim is solidly grounded, and this Court does not hold otherwise. Hypothe-
sizing that Buckley demands lump-sum damages and nothing else, the Court
ruminates on the appropriate remedy without answering the anterior ques-
tion: Does the plaintiff have a claim for relief? Buckley has shown that
Metro-North negligently exposed him to "extremely high levels of asbestos"
and that this exposure warrants "medical monitoring in order to detect and
treat [asbestos-related] diseases as they may arise" . . . [valued at $950 per
year]. We do not know from the Court's opinion what more a plaintiff must
show to qualify for relief.
Id. at 448 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
The court's treatment of plaintiff's claim led Ginsburg to state flatly that the majority
opinion simply "leaves open the question whether Buckley may state a claim for relief
under the FELA." Id. at 452. What this meant, according to her, was that the way was
open for Buckley, on remand, to replead his claim and recover for medical monitoring so
long as he did not seek that relief in lump-sum form. In her view, this course was wasteful,
irresponsible, and in violation of the letter and the spirit of Federal Rule 54(c), which
prohibits dismissal of a claim if plaintiff is entitled to relief under his proof, no matter what
legal theory he is deemed to have tried to follow. Id. at 455-56.
98. For example, a claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000), which grants
seamen a claim for personal injury caused by an employer's negligence, incorporates the
FELA. Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958). Lower courts handling
Jones Act cases have looked to Buckley for guidance on how to deal with Jones Act medi-
cal monitoring claims brought before them. See, e.g., In re Marine Asbestos Cases, 265 F.3d
861; Dragon, 726 So. 2d 1006; Badillo, 16 P.2d 435. The ambiguities in the Buckley opinion
have led these courts to treat it in disparate ways. For instance, in Marine Asbestos Cases,
the Ninth Circuit said it felt Buckley had left the availability of future monitoring costs an
open question, foreclosing only lump-sum damages awards. 265 F.3d at 867. Dragon read
Buckley even more narrowly, concluding that it had given the green light to monitoring
relief unless it came in the form of a lump-sum damages award. 726 So. 2d at 1011.
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ing whether to create or reject a state law claim for medical monitoring
relief for asymptomatic victims of tortious conduct. Indeed, in the years
since Buckley, state courts have been divided on the issue, some citing
Buckley to reject claims for relief and others granting non-lump sum
damages relief in ways they claim follow a relief route left open by the
Buckley decision.99
V. THE INDETERMINACY OF MEDICAL
MONITORING CLAIMS
While courts granting medical monitoring relief have attempted to dis-
tinguish such claims from enhanced risk and emotional distress claims, a
number of critics remain unpersuaded. The claimed simplicity of the
medical monitoring claim-a claim for medical costs a defendant has
forced upon innocent victims 00-is, according to these critics, largely a
mirage, opening up the tort system to "unprecedented expansion."10' In
their view, the indeterminacy of the standards used by courts allowing
medical monitoring claims renders such claims an open invitation for
abusive and wasteful use of the court system.10 2
As a general matter, most of the courts permitting medical monitoring
relief absent physical injury have authorized use of a generalized test em-
ploying and balancing a variety of factors. A shorthand statement of
their position is that monitoring relief should be granted upon a showing
that a defendant's conduct has caused a plaintiff to have a significant in-
crease of risk of serious disease which a reasonable physician might think
could be substantially mitigated by currently available methods of early
detection. 10 3 The decisions steadfastly refuse to require that risk be
quantified, that pre-suit objective tests be employed to determine toxic-
ity, or that any precise definition be given as to how necessary medical
surveillance must be before it is ordered. 10 4
The refusal to set objective, measurable standards has driven critics of
medical monitoring to distraction. They believe that awarding damages
without regard to a quantifiable enhanced risk standard "completely de-
stroy[s]" the causation requirements of tort law.105 Occasionally, their
99. Compare, for example, the differing readings accorded Buckley by the courts dis-
cussed in note 98 supra.
100. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
101. Klein, supra note 21, at 12-13.
102. Id. at 14.
103. The test set out here is similar to those used in most of the pro-monitoring deci-
sions flowing from Ayers. See supra note 58 and the cases cited therein. All limit relief to
cases in which plaintiff proves her case through expert testimony, but permit relief if the
balance of factors appear to the court to warrant a monitoring regime and do not require
scientific proof or mathematical quantifiability of the various imponderables-the serious-
ness of disease, the level of risk imposed by defendant, or the precise efficacy of early
detection and treatment.
104. See, e.g., Hamrick, supra note 26, at 477.
105. Klein, supra note 21, at 18. See note 68 and authorities cited therein.
Not everyone who recommends using objective "triggers" seeks to do so with a view
toward limiting plaintiffs' rights to medical monitoring. Courts and commentators have
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writing betrays strong skepticism-perhaps even cynicism-about the
ability of courts and juries to make fair evaluations of standards like "sig-
nificant," "serious," "substantial," and the like.1°6
It can hardly be argued that application of standards like "significant"
and "substantial" leaves wide room for some level of discretionary justice
that would not be in play if the monitoring cases employed clear rules
mandating mathematical measures and guaranteeing mathematic cer-
tainty. 107 In the toxic tort area, forcing each case to turn on mathematical
certainty would lead to a result in which there would likely be no justice
at all. This is because, in most cases, there simply is no scientific evidence
available to prove or disprove the crucial variables, particularly those re-
lated to the question of how or at what levels of exposure to a toxin
causes disease. 10 8 To avoid this result, the courts have been forced to
also taken the view that such "triggers" might be used as a substitute for proof of toxicity,
thus lightening the difficulty and expense of proving toxicity that might otherwise create an
insurmountable burden on plaintiffs' ability to prove toxic tort cases. See, e.g., Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 n.11 (Utah 1993); Kristen Chapin, Comment, Toxic
Torts, Public Health Data, and the Evolving Common Law: Compensation for Increased
Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 129, 148-57 (1993).
106. Hamrick quotes Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Buckley to the effect that monitor-
ing should be allowed if plaintiff "establishes that he was significantly exposed to a proven
hazardous substance ... [and] as a ... result of the exposure, [he] suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease..." Hamrick, supra note 26, at 483
(emphasis added). He then states: "These seemingly straightforward factors belie the diffi-
culties inherent in such a theory of injury and recovery. For instance, what level of expo-
sure is 'significant'? Which substances have been 'proven hazardous,' and by whom? What
level of increased risk is 'significant'? What latent diseases are serious?" Id. at 484.
Henderson and Twerski, after quoting a similar list of factors from the West Virginia
Supreme Court's decision upholding medical monitoring in Bower v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 434 (1999), admonish the reader to note that "[a]nyone familiar with
modem American trial practice will understand that, however well-meaning, this reliance
on superlatives will not prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact....
[leading inescapably to] the conclusion that defendants in these medical monitoring cases
face potentially crushing liabilities." See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 845 (foot-
notes omitted).
Goutman's critique is even more biting:
[T]he elements of medical monitoring virtually obliterate any real burden of
proof at all. Plaintiffs must prove "significant exposure." Easy, have an ex-
pert call it "significant." Your product must be a "proven hazardous sub-
stance." No problem. High dose rodent experiments will do the trick .....
Plaintiffs must be at a "significantly increased risk." A piece of cake. Plain-
tiffs' expert does not need to quantify the risk, just divine that it is somehow
"significant."
Goutman, supra note 20, at 31.
107. For a general discussion of the distinction between rules and standards, see HENRY
M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 155-58 (Tentative ed. 1958).
108. Kalas writes: "As commentators repeatedly bemoan, science is not yet able to ex-
plain, much less quantify, that disease or injury will develop following exposure to a toxic
agent. Latency periods that allow for numerous intervening causes make a determination
of cause almost prohibitive." Kalas, supra note 15, at 133. Given the fact that solid epide-
miologic evidence is prohibitively expensive for a plaintiff to produce and generally un-
available for most toxic substances, it is unreasonable to expect plaintiffs to produce such
evidence. See Green, supra note 47, at 680; Linda A. Elfenbein, Note, Future Medical
Surveillance: An Award for Toxic Tort Victims, 38 RuTGERs L. REV. 795, 802-03 (1986);
Slagel, supra note 14, at 853-56;.
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take the position that plaintiffs should be allowed to prove issues like
"causation by a preponderance of the available evidence, not by some
predetermined standard that may require nonexistent studies." 10 9 In ef-
fect, with respect to how powerful the evidence must be to justify judicial
intervention on behalf of a plaintiff, rather than leaving plaintiffs with no
redress at all, the courts have fixed the risk of uncertainty on the wrong-
doing defendant rather than fixing it on the innocent plaintiff.110
The detractors of medical monitoring claims also challenge them on the
ground that they invite frivolous claims every bit as often as do the emo-
tional distress claims. Much of the critique of emotional distress claims
arose from a fear that the standards were too vague for separating the
truly sick from the fraudulent claimant, and that the plaintiff's emotional
injury, assuming it to be real, was far too indeterminate to allow for any
kind of principled measurement of damages." 1 In addition, there is the
view that American tort law simply gives physical injuries a higher prior-
ity than emotional ones."12
Critics of medical monitoring express kindred fears regarding those
claims. They first note the indeterminacy of the finding that a plaintiff's
risks are serious or have been increased significantly by exposure to a
defendant's toxin." 3 But even conceding that, they argue about whether
the remedy of medical monitoring is appropriate. Ayers said monitoring
109. Green, supra note 47, at 680.
110. See id.
111. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. See also Geistfeld, supra note 18, at
1934:
"Tort law gives the highest priority to physical security.... Tort law accordingly limits
duty to exclude stand-alone claims for emotional harm in order to give physically injured
plaintiffs a much higher chance of receiving full compensation for their injuries;" Peter H.
Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 575-76 (1992) [hereinafter Schuck] (arguing that asbestos patients'
claims for distress should be docketed after disposal of physical injury cases because de-
fendants' resources are limited, and "the claims of those who are not now (and may never
become) sick, but who genuinely fear becoming so" are entitled to lower priority than
claims of those already impaired). This, indeed, is what many courts ended up doing in the
asbestos cases: Once it became obvious that early emotional distress claims were draining
the defendants' resources to the point that they were no longer likely to be able to meet
their obligation to pay for more serious physical illnesses, judges began to set up registry
systems. These registry systems put emotional distress and other early claims on indefinite
hold, only to be put back on the courts' active dockets once full-blown serious diseases
manifested themselves. See generally Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship
for the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Behrens].
113. See supra note 68. It is often argued that the standards of liability are so weak that
plaintiffs can secure monitoring relief in cases in which the increase in risk to their health is
infinitesimally small, thus creating a grossly overbroad and expensive remedy. See, e.g.,
Maskin, supra note 92, at 532. One author said that judges had found "significant" an
increase in risk from exposure when the increase measured between 1 x10 - and 1 x 10 -.
Goutman, supra note 20, at 28. Still another writer critical of monitoring began his article
by setting out as a "paradigm case" a scenario by which plaintiff's exposure has increased
her likelihood of contracting liver cancer from 10 in 100,000 to 15 in 100,000. Klein, supra
note 21, at 1.
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should be ordered if it was "reasonable and necessary. 11 4 Do these
words mean the same thing, and if not, by what standard should "neces-
sity" be judged? 115 A number of writers express strong reservations
about the medical efficacy of monitoring regimes, suggesting that the
costs of monitoring for most diseases far outweigh any likely medical ben-
efits, and that the main reason plaintiffs may go for such relief may be
psychological. 16 George McCarter notes the unpredictability of diagnos-
tic testing procedures, the risks and costs of many tests, and the paucity of
evidence that many lead to real improvement in mortality or morbidity
through early detection of a large variety of diseases.1 7 His skepticism
pales in comparison to that expressed by Thomas M. Goutman in Medical
Monitoring: How Bad Science Makes Bad Law.118 Immediately prior to a
discussion of "The Science of Medical Monitoring" between "Medical
Monitoring 101"(i.e., "real" science for the nonscientists) and "Court-
room Medical Monitoring 101" (i.e., the "baroque" pseudoscience of the
legal world)," a9 Goutman flatly tells the reader that medical science rec-
ommends only six identified diagnostic tests (each for specific medical
conditions) for apparently healthy, asymptomatic patients; in his view, no
other screening protocols for asymptomatic individuals are ever medically
appropriate.' 20
Medical monitoring claims have proven more palatable to courts than
claims for emotional distress because the monitoring costs are seen as
more concrete and definite than emotional distress. While resolution of
questions of causation and damages still requires presentation and evalu-
114. 525 A.2d at 312.
115. Among courts favoring medical monitoring, the proof plaintiff must put on to jus-
tify the monitoring regime varies from tribunal to tribunal. At one end of the spectrum are
cases like In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990). One of the early
leading cases upholding monitoring relief, the Third Circuit found it sufficient that there
was expert testimony that, in the opinion of the physician in question there was a reasona-
ble medical need for early detection and treatment warranting monitoring relief. Id. at 861.
The Ayers court went even further, upholding a claim for medical monitoring not only of
"conventional" screening protocols but also of "unconventional" ones, so long as they
were supported by expert medical testimony. 525 A.2d at 287 n.13. They also had to be
"consistent with contemporary scientific principles." Id. at 309. Other cases have not been
so generous to plaintiffs. Several courts have required the plaintiff to show that the testing
she desires "is of a type that a reasonable physician in the area of specialty would order for
a similarly situated patient." Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 361 (La.
1998); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 980 (Utah 1993). A few courts
set an even more stringent standard; to prevail, a plaintiff must show that "accepted medi-
cal practice ... deem[s] it necessary to perform such tests in the future." Miranda v. Shell
Oil Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
Slagel, attempting to draw a middle ground, argues that no test should be covered by
monitoring relief unless "a 'respectable minority' of physicians recognize the test as benefi-
cial in the early detection of latent toxic substance diseases." Slagel, supra note 14, at 875.
116. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 68; Goutman, supra note 20.
117. McCarter, supra note 68, at 275-82.
118. Goutman, supra note 20.
119. See id. at 6-16.
120. See id. at 6. It probably will not surprise the reader to learn that none of the
conditions Goutman lists as appropriate for screening is a condition commonly asserted to
have been made more risky on account of toxic exposures.
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ation of expert testimony, plaintiffs have often been able to persuade the
courts that the monitoring remedy is less subject to subjective and wildly
emotional factors than is the case in the emotional distress cases. 121
Though not inexpensive, the ultimate damages awards are believed likely
smaller and make the suits less subject to fraudulent claims because the
relief can be tightly tied to covering only expected medical bills for
screening services the average plaintiff would likely forego unless she
thought they were necessary.' 22 Moreover, focusing on whether the
threat is objectively real and sufficient enough so that a reasonable plain-
tiff ought not to have to endure it without having at least her out-of-
pocket medical costs paid clearly seems less likely to invite a flood of
false, fraudulent, or frivolous claims than would a cause of action focused
on the enhanced, but ultimately subjectively measured, emotional distress
levels of a plaintiff's condition.
The indeterminacy of issues like toxicity of particular products, causa-
tion of particular diseases, or the efficacy of particular medical protocols
in response to toxic exposures presents troubling issues. The courts are
rightly concerned about the quality of proof of toxicity, causation, and the
efficacy of treatment protocols in all toxic tort cases, and they certainly
should be so in the cases in which, before actual physical injury, a plaintiff
seeks some monitoring relief to limit the effects of enhanced risk of dis-
ease. The fact is that, in today's world, proof to a moral certainty of just
how destructive a given toxin is, just what the statistical likelihood is that
a given exposure is likely to cause injury, or even precisely how accurate
screening technologies are and how effective early medical interventions
are likely to be, is simply unavailable-and not likely to be available for
some time into the future, if ever. Requiring a particular quantum of
proof in effect would write off medical monitoring in all but the most
limited circumstances, simply because in most cases nobody knows pre-
121. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433, 443 (1997)(FELA case rejecting negligent infliction of emotional injury because of difficulty in sepa-
rating serious from trivial claims, fear of unlimited liability, and "potential flood of litiga-
tion," while reserving issue whether monitoring should be ordered in part because issue of
separating justified from unjustified claims may be less serious there than in emotional
distress cases); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 P.2d 795, 814, 823-24 (Cal. 1993)(rejecting emotional distress claims unless physical disease more probably than not to
come because of "intangible nature of the loss: difficulty of measuring the damage" and
unsuitability of money to cover it, and social costs involved in trying to compensate plain-
tiff, while accepting monitoring as reasonable claim for predictable, non-speculative losses
caused by tortious activity established under traditional theories); Hansen, 858 P.2d at 975,
978-79 (rejecting emotional distress claim as too speculative where not proven through
substantial evidence of objectively reasonable contraction of recognized mental illness or
physical symptoms, but allowing claim for medical monitoring where there is a demonstra-
ble need for medical monitoring services and there is no need to quantify risk because
issue is not whether disease will ensue, but simply whether risk is high enough to warrant
monitoring).
122. Most writers have to concede that the incentives to undergo medical monitoring,
precisely because it is often unpleasant and time-consuming, are not great, and that any
medical monitoring regime that limits payment to funding or reimbursing monitoring costs
eliminates most of the risk that plaintiffs will bring bad faith claims with a view of getting
rich off of defendants. See supra note 92 and authorities cited therein.
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cisely how likely the chances are that a given dosage of a toxin will cause
a particular disease. In most cases being brought to the courts, nobody
has conducted sound epidemiological studies of the disease process re-
sulting from exposure to toxins, and such studies may be decades away.
Nor, in most cases, is there clear, irrefragable scientific evidence regard-
ing the medical efficacy of early detection and disease.
This does not mean that courts should not take current knowledge,
such as it is, seriously. After all, the medical profession does. In an area
where the doctors believe that a given exposure creates a sufficiently sub-
stantial risk to warrant a medical intervention, it hardly seems appropri-
ate for courts to ignore the doctors' educated judgments by refusing to
rely upon them when determining how the common law should operate.
The fact that our knowledge of toxicity, causation, cure rates, and the like
present questions today answerable only with professional judgments
rather than with tight statistical proof does not mean one should adopt a
head-in-the-sand view toward them. If doctors cannot solve these ques-
tions with tight mathematical solutions, neither can patients; why on
earth should the courts? 123 Given the fact that in most cases sound scien-
tific studies have not yet been conducted and may be decades away, if
there is some uncertainty, it only seems fair to say where uncertainty is
not large and the burden on the tortfeasor not great, the burden of uncer-
tainty should fall upon the wrongdoer, not the victim.124
VI. OVERDETERRENCE AND COMPENSATION: JUDICIAL
BREAKDOWN IN THE ASBESTOS CASES
Opponents of medical monitoring frequently note that monitoring re-
lief is often not cheap. In a mass tort situation, with thousands of victims
each requiring an annual array of examinations and tests over the next
twenty or thirty years, the burden on industry clearly would not be incon-
sequential. But in the usual toxic tort case, the issue is not whether the
medical surveillance should be conducted, but who should pay for them.
The expense argument, standing alone, does not advance the argument
one way or the other; the costliness of the tests can cut two ways because
it also demonstrates that plaintiffs' claims for monitoring relief are clearly
not frivolous but indeed may be quite substantial.
123. Courts currently do not set standards of proof unreasonably high when deciding
whether monitoring is appropriate after a victim has suffered a physical injury.
124. The public injunction cases tell us that allowing a remedy to go beyond what the
law requires it can nevertheless be justified if such an order is necessary to assure at least
full protection of the plaintiffs rightful position. See, David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure
of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy,
72 MINN. L. REv. 627, 679 (1988). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978)
(allowing 30-day injunction to correct prison violence from overcrowding). At law, the
courts have long held that, in measuring damages where there is some uncertainty as to the
precise measure, the risk of uncertainty should fall upon the defendant whose misconduct
created the problem rather than upon the innocent victim. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES 319-20 (2d ed.
1993).
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Opponents of medical monitoring usually tie concerns about expense
to the two core functions of tort law-deterrence and compensation.
First, they often point out that the use of chemicals in the modern world
is widespread and the number of potential claims and claimants is poten-
tially mind-boggling; 125 they then suggest that allowing monitoring claims
is likely to swamp industry with a gigantic flood of claims that are waste-
ful because they serve little public good and principally enrich the plain-
tiffs' bar,126 and because they likely will dampen entrepreneurial
enthusiasm and innovation in developing new products and technolo-
gies.127 Second, opponents often express fear that allowing plaintiffs to
recover for unrealized injuries will bankrupt defendants, leaving the most
seriously injured victims of mass toxic torts haplessly without remedy by
the time their illnesses fully ripen.128 Not infrequently, the argument in-
vites attention to the history of asbestos litigation in this country; the
claim is that the asbestos cases represent an unmitigated disaster for the
American tort system and that the problem is likely to be repeated in
other toxic tort cases.129 Finally, at the least, these writers argue, the con-
cerns about overdeterrence and bankruptcy should make courts chary of
modifying time-honored (if arbitrary) limits on common law liability.
This argument would remove the whole debate from the courts and place
125. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 850; Klein, supra note 21, at 13;
Martin & Martin, supra note 21, at 130-31; Maskin, supra note 92, at 529; Schwartz, supra
note 19, at 1071-72; Hamrick, supra note 26, at 471.
126. The belief that monitoring regimes are largely a waste of money is widespread
among critics. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 844 ("wasteful of scarce
resources"); Martin & Martin, supra note 21, at 121 ("unwarranted expense") ("not ...
worthwhile"); Maskin, supra note 92, at 547 ("plaintiffs' counsel ... only real winners");
see also Schuck, supra note 112, at 576-77 (suggesting that, in asbestos cases, at least, "some
evidence suggests that ... effective screening procedures are not yet available, and...
early detection does not improve the prospects of cure").
127. Overdeterrence is a problem for both Klein as well as Henderson and Twerski, see
Klein, supra note 21, at 22, 25-27; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 843. Others-
even critics of medical monitoring-disagree. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 68, at 6, 48
n.163, 70; Martin & Martin, supra note 21, at 139-40.
128. Hamrick, supra note 26, at 471; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 850;
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1062.
129. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 850. Other writers do not push the argu-
ment beyond the asbestos context, but do strongly suggest that the flood of asbestos litiga-
tion certainly left many seriously ill victims without a remedy because litigation claims and
expenses of less serious claims exhausted defendant's resources before the more seriously
ill claimants could recover. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 112, at 554-57. The scarcity of
resources to pay the bill for asbestos injuries has created attempts by plaintiffs suffering
from more serious injuries to get a priority over anyone suffering less serious injuries, as
was attempted in behalf of persons suffering malignancies against non-malignant victims in
the settlement provision set aside in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). This
scarcity has also led to conflicts between persons suffering present injuries and those with
only likely future injuries as in Achem Prods. v. George Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
Such conflicts have impeded the orderly and fair resolution of the asbestos cases. See gen-
erally Behrens, supra note 112; Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Com-
mons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002) [hereinafter McGovern]; and led courts to set up
sophisticated docketing systems to prevent emotional distress claims from exhausting de-
fendants' resources before more seriously ill people could have opportunity to sue for and
collect for their physical illnesses.
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it in legislatures. 130
None of these arguments should be persuasive. The argument that
medical monitoring is an unmitigated waste of resources, asserted with
quite variable levels of vigor and confidence by opponents of medical
monitoring, 131 has not been accepted by a single court that has examined
the issue.
The waste of money argument takes four forms. First, there is an argu-
ment that rules relating to elevated risk are so lax as to be nonexistent.
132
Proponents of this argument obviously reject as mere verbiage the admo-
nition of courts like Ayers that the plaintiff must prove a "significant" or
"serious" increase in risk before monitoring should be ordered. 133 Sec-
ond, it is often strongly argued that victims of toxic torts may not really
want medical monitoring or may not avail themselves of it when it is of-
fered to them. 134 This argument is speculative on its face, and court or-
ders creating trust funds or limiting plaintiffs to getting reimbursement
for monies expended for monitoring eliminates whatever danger may ex-
ist that monies awarded will be frittered away. Third, there is the argu-
ment that since a plaintiff may have medical insurance, payment of
monitoring costs by defendant is unnecessary and redundant.135 This ar-
gument may explain why allowing medical monitoring relief is not, for
the insured, an absolute necessity. However, this argument ignores the
130. See, e.g., Martin & Martin, supra note 21, at 131; Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1071-
80. See also, E. Donald Elliot, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
799, 803 (1985) (institutions other than courts better equipped to evaluate risks); Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 318 (1985) (courts poorly equipped to assess risk).
131. Goutman, supra note 20, is the most vigorous proponent of this position. Others
are less certain. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. Perhaps the most indirect
and weakest version of the argument is set out by Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16,
who argue against the need for monitoring by suggesting (1) that "many, if not most, per-
sons exposed to toxic substances do not want to be monitored," basing this conclusion on
the belief that if lump-sum awards were made for monitoring the recipients would spend it
on other subjects, and (2) that most Americans ("admittedly not all) are [already] covered
by... general health insurance which presumably is in place to carry the lion's part (admit-
tedly not all) of the financial burden of medical monitoring." Id. at 844.
Close examination shows that their first argument is incomplete; whether people are
anxious to undergo inconvenient, uncomfortable, and occasionally risky medical examina-
tions is simply not the same question as whether they need to do so, or whether they would
undergo examinations if they were told by their doctors that they were necessary and the
examinations were free.
Given all the caveats, (the "admittedly not all" limitations they conceded), their collat-
eral source argument is incomplete on its face. It suffers from other infirmities as well. It
assumes that insurance markets would remain static after a toxic tort occurred and that
insurance coverage would remain the same even if tortfeasors were forced to pay monitor-
ing costs. Neither assumption has been verified and both are highly questionable. See
supra note 23. In addition, even if it were true that everyone had prepaid for diagnostic
services through insurance, that would not justify refusing to reimburse them (or their
insurers) for their expenses. The whole question is who should pay for the monitoring
expenses, and it simply is not an answer to say somebody else has shown a willingness to
pay so the tortfeasors should get off the hook.
132. See supra notes 68 and 106 and authorities cited therein.
133. 525 A.2d at 312.
134. See supra note 92 and authorities cited therein.
135. See supra notes 23 and 129 and authorities discussed therein.
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fundamental tenet of the American remedial justice system that an inno-
cent plaintiff is rightfully entitled to full compensation for wrongs done
him by a defendant, 136 and that forcing plaintiff to pay extra insurance
rates to cover losses defendant has imposed on him is inefficient because
it permits defendant to foist off on plaintiff what in reality is a cost of
defendant's doing business. 137 Finally, there is an argument that there is
little or no medical efficacy to monitoring for many diseases.' 38 This ar-
gument completely bypasses the fact that medical necessity is an element
of the cause of action in all the cases upholding medical monitoring. 139
Professor Klein has argued that it is inappropriate to allow monitoring
relief in any case in which a plaintiff, once his latent disease becomes
manifest, would not be able to recover for personal injury.140 As he
states it, "monitoring plaintiffs ... are not truly seeking compensation for
what the defendant has done, [but] rather they are seeking compensation
to protect against what the defendant's conduct might do in the fu-
ture.' 141 In his view, monitoring relief covering people whose sickness, if
and when it arrives, would not be chargeable to defendant's misconduct is
overbroad, and affording it leads to overdeterrence.
Klein's argument is flawed, however. It assumes that the only loss peo-
ple suffer when a toxic tort is visited upon them is the disease they may
136. The fundamental principle of damages is to restore a victim, as nearly as possible,
to the position he would have enjoyed had it not been for the wrong committed by the
defendant. See, e.g., Chronister Oil Co. v. Unocal Ref. & Mktg., 34 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958).
137. The classical school of law and economics subscribes to the notion that the law
should generally encourage profitable activity, even activity that harms others, so long as
law violators pay for the damages they cause. Activity that is profitable after payment of
the costs it imposes on others is "efficient" or "economical," according to this view, and
therefore, good. Under this view, it really does not matter who directly gets paid those
costs-victims, the government, or even plaintiffs' lawyers-so long as they get paid, be-
cause it is payment that promotes efficiency by deterring only "inefficient" conduct and
encouraging that which is "efficient." But there may be "secondary" reasons for paying
the money as compensation to victims, which include the fact that such payments en-
courage the right level of enforcement of rights and because without such payment victims
would likely become overcautious in trying to avoid being injured. See RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10 at 209 (5th ed. 1998).
138. See generally Goutman, supra note 20; McCarter, supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
139. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990); Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 825 (Cal. 1993); Ayers v. Township of Jack-
son, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987). In order to impose liability on a tortfeasor for monitor-ing expenses, every single case upholding the relief has mandated that plaintiff to show,
through expert testimony, that the surveillance regime to be funded has been made medi-
cally reasonable and necessary by plaintiff's exposure to defendant's toxin. Failing such
proof, defendant has no liability.
A small minority of jurisdictions take the view that plaintiff need not show that early
detection is likely to improve her health prospects. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 434 (W. Va. 1999); Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the Army, 696
A.2d 137, 146 n.8 (1997). These cases uphold monitoring if it provides early detection
because it will improve a plaintiffs quality of life and because, as medical science im-
proves, new treatments may be developed that would be aided through early detection.
See also discussion supra note 30.
140. Klein, supra note 21, at 16, 18-21.
141. Id. atl2.
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later contract; the only cost of a toxic tort is the disease it causes, and
once industry pays that cost it should get off free. But this is clearly not
so. Klein seems utterly oblivious to the fact that failure to make defend-
ants responsible for putting people at risk of harm actually encourages
anti-social dumping of toxins on society by allowing defendants to exter-
nalize the costs they impose on society by threatening it with harm. The
argument assumes that, for people who ultimately are not destined to get
sick or for whose illnesses a corporate defendant would not be found lia-
ble, the harms that a defendant's misconduct causes are inconsequential.
But they are not. Consider, for a moment, a defendant who forces upon a
fifty-five year-old plaintiff the equivalent of a twenty-five year dosage of
four packs of cigarette smoke per day. A plaintiff would very likely want
medical monitoring for lung cancer and heart disease. The fact is that it is
not true that a plaintiff is probably going to contract lung cancer, and if
she comes down with heart disease, it would be hard to maintain that the
smoking is probably what caused it. Does this mean that a plaintiff would
not be apprehensive about contracting one or the other of these major
killers? Of course not. If her doctor were to tell her that her history war-
ranted a regimen of yearly chest X-rays and an annual examination for
cardiovascular disease, why should plaintiff have to pay for it?
Beyond that, limiting recovery of medical monitoring costs to situa-
tions in which a defendant's toxin is probably going to cause a plaintiff
serious illness, or in any event would, if a plaintiff did get sick, render a
defendant liable, ignores the burdens a defendant's wrongful conduct will
impose upon victims who cannot prove that their illness will arise from or
has arisen from defendant's conduct; the fact is that whenever the defen-
dant has put a reasonable plaintiff in the position where a doctor must tell
her to undergo a reasonable, long term regimen of preventive screening
tests to save her life, a plaintiff has been placed in the position of suffer-
ing harm independent of those harms involved in actually coming down
with the disease. Put in this position, the plaintiff is forced to spend time
and money on tests she thinks she must undergo to survive, and she is
likely scared out of her wits to boot.142 It can hardly be overdeterrence
142. As stated in Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1694-95,
A person who is wrongly subjected to a significant threat of a serious disease
has been harmed in very important respects. A cloud has been placed over
her life, and one can imagine that cloud of impending death intruding on her
life significantly. Particularly if the risk is associated with an infectious and
potentially fatal disease, the pall cast not only by the reduced prospects for
normal life-expectancy, but also by the risk of infection, might undermine her
self-confidence and cause her to alter significantly her plans, relationships,
and activities . . . as false imprisonment causes a spatial confinement and
thereby deprives one of an important form of liberty, so this cloud of im-
pending disease constitutes a temporal confinement. ...
It is a platitude ... that what constitutes [actionable] injury is a normative
matter ... Undoubtedly it is tempting to treat . . . the "cloud" or "pall"
associated with threat of illness as boiling down to probabilities: If the likeli-
hood of the disease reaches a certain threshold, then it is actionable as a
negligently created threat; otherwise it is not .... No doubt, percentage like-
lihood matters-the more remote the possibility, the less it is plausible to say
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to make defendant pay these "costs," too.
The argument that medical monitoring will lead to overdeterrence is
impossible to prove, 143 but what evidence there is suggests that
overdeterrence from medical monitoring relief is in fact highly un-
likely.144 Factors militating against overdeterrence include the lack of
knowledge of victimization that people exposed to toxins may have which
prevents them from even considering bringing toxic tort cases, the enor-
mous problems and costs of proof that plaintiffs' lawyers encounter in
pursuing toxic tort cases, the difficulties of bringing class actions in toxic
tort situations, 145 the admitted reluctance of many victims to undergo
medical surveillance protocols even when they are recommended and of-
fered for free, and the resistance of the bar to taking on cases wherein
collection of a contingent fee is difficult and likely to result in payments
over long periods of time. 146
Medical monitoring claims are unlikely to provide enough deterrence
to compel defendants to avoid committing toxic torts. But failing to allow
monitoring claims will systematically cause underdeterrence. This is true
for several reasons. First, failure to allow monitoring claims shifts to vic-
tims a whole host of costs of corporate enterprise that businesses ought to
bear if one is to maximize efficiency. The costs of toxic torts include
more than simply the cost of disease; they also include the out-of-pocket
medical screening expenses fairly chargeable to a defendant's tortious ac-
tivity because, but for those activities, the victims would not have had to
that defendant's negligence is responsible (as opposed to the plaintiff) for the
resulting pall.. . . But the question is not strictly factual. Whether the threat
of disease and the interferences [with daily living] constitute something sig-
nificant enough to count as an "injury" seems to call for a more general ac-
count of what goods are needed for a life to go well or to be going well.... It
resembles the question of what sorts of conditions constitute a "disability":
It is a normative question that hinges on an assessment of the capacities and
activities that are important to a person's life going well.
143. Opponents argue that medical monitoring cases create "the possibility of signifi-
cant overdeterrence," Henderson & Twerski, supra note 16, at 843, or "raise[ ] serious
concerns of overdeterrence," Klein, supra note 21, at 27. The weight of opinion is against
their position. Martin & Martin, supra note 21, who also oppose medical monitoring, nev-
ertheless concede that "the deterrent value of awarding medical monitoring costs is usually
minimal." Id. at 139. Brennan, supra note 68, concurs. The latter flatly states that
"[e]mpirical evidence suggests that environmental torts suits currently send a weak deter-
rent signal." Id. at 6. He also argues that, given the relative lack of deterrence provided by
other institutions, future "overdeterrence seems doubtful." Id. at 48 n.163.
144. Id. at 70.
145. The average medical monitoring award for an individual would likely be too small
to support a contingent fee arrangement with a good attorney, especially one adept enough
to handle the difficulties of complex litigation involving experts in toxicology, medicine,
and the like. The most likely way to make such litigation feasible, absent an attorney fee-
shifting statute like the environmental protection statute being enforced in Redland SoccerClub, 696 A.2d at 139-40, would be for plaintiff's lawyer to take the case as a class action so
that the attorney could collect a fee, through the common fund rule, from the class. For adiscussion of the difficulties of pursuing monitoring claims as class actions, see infra note
187.
146. Blumenberg, supra note 28, at 695-97, attempts to discuss the difficulties attorneys
may have in collecting contingent fees from future flow of payments, but she does not
explain why many lawyers will want to collect fees over such a long period of time.
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undertake medical screening. Even if medical monitoring awards were
limited to those who could show that, should they become sick, the dis-
ease contracted was fairly attributable to the defendant's misconduct, de-
fendants would not have a full incentive to pay early in hope of avoiding
more ruinous expenses for even larger costs in the future. Business de-
fendants have a disincentive to pay monitoring costs for long-delayed dis-
eases until the diseases occur, because they can have the benefit of
investing the money they should have paid out in monitoring costs in
other endeavors until such time as the victim comes down sick.
147
Standing alone, the argument that medical monitoring relief will lead
to the financial ruin of defendant corporations has little force. After all,
if a business causes harm to others that costs more than the business can
bear without going broke, it is hard to argue that it is better that the
victims be forced to subsidize the business by absorbing its externalized
costs than it is to note simply that, at least in a capitalistic system, it is the
business that should suffer, through internalization of its costs, even if this
leads the business into bankruptcy. Neither the corrective justice model
of classic American remedies doctrine 148 nor "law and economics" the-
ory149 justify sacrificing good justice for corporate welfare.
The bankruptcy argument is not left to stand alone, however. It is usu-
ally accompanied by an argument that monitoring relief, in the toxic tort
case, will prove so expensive that it will likely exhaust the financial re-
sources of corporate defendants with the result that they will be ban-
krupted by the time that other victims of the torts in question, those who
suffer serious physical harms years or even decades after discovery of the
tortious activity, realize their injuries and get around to trying to collect
damages for them.150 The argument is often reinforced by giving refer-
ence to the history of asbestos litigation over the past several decades-a
history in which a number of generous damages awards for minor ill-
nesses early in the game left many more seriously ill plaintiffs without
recourse when their illnesses came to flower so late that when they finally
were able to assert claims for full damages, they discovered that the man-
ufacturers legally responsible for their losses were hopelessly insolvent.'
51
Indeed, invocation of this "horrible" is, to the opponent of medical moni-
toring, very much like showing that the opponent holds a trump card that
ought to foreclose further debate.
147. Brennan, supra note 68, notes that "[m]edical monitoring ... creates costs, hence
deterrence signals, for producers who could otherwise, quite rationally in a market sense,
discount to present values the cost of injuries that will occur after a latency period has
run." Id. at 70.
148. See supra note 136.
149. See supra note 137.
150. This concern was expressed by Justice Breyer in Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1997). For a discussion of Buckley, see text supra at notes
71-99. Numerous law review articles express the same concern. See, e.g., Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 16, at 850; Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1062; Hamrick, supra note 26, at
471.
151. See supra note 127 and authorities discussed therein.
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Like the claim of threatened overdeterrence, the bankruptcy argument
is grossly overdrawn. There is no evidence that medical monitoring
claims have ever driven any defendant in the United States into insol-
vency. The very unattractiveness of medical monitoring procedures to
many plaintiffs152 suggests that, if the remedy is limited to funding moni-
toring costs through an injunction creating an equitable trust fund or oth-
erwise mandating only reimbursement for monitoring expenses actually
incurred, 53 many patients who are entitled to monitoring relief will not
avail themselves of it, and that those who do will be people whose health
prospects have indeed been dimmed by what defendants have done and
are believed by the plaintiffs to be enhanced by the screening they are
now able to get.
Moreover, the asbestos cases are not a fit paradigm for most of the
monitoring claims that will be brought in the future. Experience of the
asbestos cases can be instructive, but the lesson learned need not be that
nothing should ever be done about toxic torts until people are so sick as
to be on the verge of death; to suggest otherwise is essentially to use the
asbestos cases as a bogey-man rather than to analyze what happened
there with a view toward not repeating it. What drove the asbestos com-
panies into early bankruptcy was not a spate of medical monitoring judg-
ments or settlements, but a series of suits in which plaintiffs with evidence
of exposure but no disease (e.g., thickening of the pleura of the lungs,
discovery of minute threads of asbestos in the lungs, etc.) or relatively
minor disease (i.e., asbestosis) were allowed to collect generous damages
awards for full-fledged injury, emotional distress, and enhanced risk of
future losses. The result of the treatment of the early cases stripped most
players in the industry of funds before more serious asbestos-caused ma-
lignant diseases ripened, so that in the end, when there was widespread
bankruptcy in the industry; the victims who came to seek relief late in the
game all too often found the cupboard had been stripped bare by those
who had suffered no, or only minor, losses.154
The monitoring cases simply do not fit into the asbestos paradigm for
several reasons. First, the awards in medical monitoring cases are limited
to future medical expenses and are not likely to involve overcompensa-
tion. This is true for two reasons. First, the very fact that the awards are
limited tends to differentiate them from the asbestos judgments, which
often permitted generous recoveries on negligent infliction of emotional
distress theories and often counted even minor injuries as the proper oc-
casion for making lump-sum awards for "pain and suffering," enhanced
risk of future complications, and future medical treatment costs. It was
this problem that led to the docketing registries in the asbestos cases, not
excessive medical monitoring expenses.' 55 Additionally, the monitoring
152. See supra note 92 and authorities discussed therein.
153. This kind of limitation is recommended in Ayers and Potter and is mandated under
the law of a number of states. See supra note 11 and cases cited therein.
154. See McGovern, supra note 129; Schuck, supra note 112.
155. See Behrens, supra note 112; Schuck, supra note 112.
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remedy should not ever produce a "double recovery," unlike the asbestos
cases which, once they began permitting multiple successive asbestos ex-
posures actions, first for the fear of contracting serious illness, then again
for getting it (along with the mental anguish that entailed), virtually guar-
anteed double recoveries.
Second, a properly administered monitoring case should be triable in
equity.156 This makes a monitoring case different from an asbestos dam-
ages case in several ways. First, the mere fact that the case will be tried to
a judge, not to a jury, should eliminate, or at least minimize, the fears that
inflamed jury passions will lead to inflated, pro-plaintiff verdicts. In addi-
tion, because the proceeding would be in equity, the judge could decide,
in the few cases wherein she believed the empty cupboard scenario was a
real threat in the future, to disallow monitoring, either on a limited basis
for those plaintiffs whose own insurance will pay the bill,157 or on a total
basis, where the equities demanded eliminating screening for future dis-
ease so as to take care of the more pressing need of caring for victims
already afflicted with serious illness.
Third, many toxic tort cases simply differ from the asbestos cases in
ways which make replication of the asbestos "horrible" extremely un-
likely. Professor Brennan has indicated that environmental pollution
problems vary in terms of toxicity levels, the degree to which the toxin is
dispersed, and the number of sources of the toxin, and that the variety of
environmental paradigms ought to logically give rise to different legal re-
sponses.158 Environmental disasters involving contaminated water sup-
156. See infra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
157. Note here I am assuming that, as a normal matter, the court should not refuse
monitoring where there is a collateral source of insurance money available to defray the
victim's monitoring costs; in my view, such refusal should only occur in extremis.
My position is inconsistent with that suggested by several courts and commentators to
the extent that monitoring relief should be unavailable if plaintiff has her own insurance.
None that I know of provide any real explanation for this view, and it certainly is not the
dominant one regarding the availability of payments from collateral sources. As Ginsberg
& Weiss, supra note 28, point out:
From a logical point of view,... all medical expenses should be reimbursed
even if other coverage exists, since maximum internalization of cost will
thereby be achieved. An additional rationale for such an approach is that the
victim has paid the premiums for other health coverage. If the Fund paid all
medical expenses, the additional "windfall" payment from private or group
health insurance would be in lieu of a return of premiums.
Id. at 936.
Conceding that as "a practical matter, such a policy might have an adverse impact on
private premium rates [because] other policyholders would [end up] subsidizing the vic-
tim's double recovery," Id. Ginsberg & Weiss conclude that "[t]he question would resolve
itself within a short period of time in any event, since full medical reimbursement by the
Fund would probably result in excluding from private policy coverage injuries caused by
exposure to hazardous wastes." Id. In short, if the court allowed liability in all cases re-
gardless of whether plaintiff had other insurance, in the cases where plaintiff did have
insurance the insurance carriers would quickly respond by cutting coverage and premiums,
thus eliminating overinsurance, double recoveries, and high premium rates among the gen-
eral public.
158. Brennon, supra note 68, at 10-17.
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plies, 159 landfills, 160 toxic dumps, 161 or workplace radiation 162 create
narrower and more localized disputes than did the asbestos paradigm,
presenting more discrete claims involving a limited number of victims ex-
posed over a short period of years in a small geographic area. Such cases
present vastly different problems as compared to the asbestos cases, and
it is simply inappropriate to suggest that the asbestos "horrible" is likely
to be replicated in the context in which cases like them have to be
resolved.163
In the end, the last argument standing is that the complexities of toxic
tort litigation, the concerns about overdeterrence, and the risk of ban-
krupting tortfeasors by having them pay minor costs before the big bills
come in from victims with full-blown disease combine to mandate that
courts adhere to the physical injury rule and decline to grant monitoring
relief unless and until legislatures have had a chance to study the matter
and resolve it. The suggestion that courts are inappropriate organs for
changing the law and should await legislative intervention ignores the fact
that it was the courts, not the legislatures, that created the physical injury
requirement in the first place. More important, it assumes a willingness
of the legislature to engage itself in addressing the problem-an assump-
tion that, so far, does not seem realistic. 164 Indeed, the most ardent sup-
porters of this alternative have little good to say about any medical
monitoring regime, 165 thus suggesting that their ode to the wisdom of leg-
islative solutions may be little more than an excuse for burying reform in
the pit of legislative inertia. In addition, the argument ignores the fact
that the common law tort action may, in some cases, be the best available
way to deter dangerous environmental poisonings. As Professor Brennan
has pointed out elsewhere, different environmental paradigms may well
warrant different kinds of legal responses, with the nod going toward liti-
gation in those cases where the number of potential defendants is rela-
tively low, the dispersal of the toxin not wide in time or space, and the
relief limited to monitoring, as opposed to general, damages. 166
159. E.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
160. E.g., Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 137.
161. E.g., Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
162. E.g., Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
163. This is not to say that some mass tort claims have similarities to the asbestos
claims. Consider, in this regard, tobacco litigation, for example, Barnes v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998) and the fen/phen cases, for example, In re Diet Drugs
Products Liability Litig., No. 98-20626, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26,
1999), both of which involved several million claimants claiming to suffer nationwide expo-
sures to toxins derived from multiple sources in variable circumstances over varying peri-
ods of time.
164. See Schuck, supra note 112, at 552 (counting on Congress to initiate legislation to
solve asbestos crisis likened "to plac[ing] one's faith in tooth fairies").
165. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1071-80.
166. Brennan, supra note 68. Brennan suggests that thirty or more years of regulatory
response to environmental poisoning has not provided an adequate deterrent to the flow of
toxins into the environment, id. at 22-38, and that criminal law and market forces have also
failed in the task. Id. at 38-44. He then suggests that the overhead costs of litigation and
the problems of proving causation make it almost impossible for tort law to adequately
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VII. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS SHOWS ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF MEDICAL MONITORING RELIEF EXPANDS
SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAILURE TO DO SO DIMINISHES IT
Allowing a cause of action for medical monitoring relief advances pub-
lic welfare on almost any fair cost-benefits analysis of the issues in ques-
tion. In virtually any case, a plaintiff's gain from getting medical
monitoring relief far outweighs a defendant's costs. I am not here refer-
ring to an argument that a plaintiff's life may be saved .by the monitoring
regime and life is of incalculable value. Rather, I am noting that the psy-
chological benefit to the plaintiff of being able to carry through a pro-
gram of medical screening to save her life is offset by no cost to the
defendant. Failure to count the benefits involved in relieving plaintiff's
fears and anxiety that medical monitoring might afford-benefits not
only to the plaintiff but also in her family relations and productivity as a
worker in society-can lead one to conclude that there is no net social
welfare gain to be had from passing medical monitoring costs from the
defendant to the plaintiff, and no loss to be suffered if the loss is simply
allowed to lie upon the plaintiff. But this is clear error.
It is no accident that lawyers have frequently accompanied their medi-
cal monitoring claims with claims of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 167 In the cases in which defendants have placed plaintiffs in
perilous limbo-facing the long term threat of harm because of the inde-
terminate but real threat of future illness-the cost to the plaintiffs is
unlikely to be simply the cost of medical testing; in addition to suffering
that economic harm, the plaintiffs are also suffering psychological stress.
As indicated above, 68 the courts have generally refused to provide com-
pensation for this psychological stress because the loss suffered is not sub-
ject to objective proof and valuation, and it is open to the wildest
speculation. But the courts that reject psychological harm do not do so
because they believe it is not real; their concern is that it is too hard the
measure.
Medical monitoring relief would not only relieve a plaintiff of the fi-
nancial costs of paying for preventive medical screening; it would also
alleviate much of the fear and anguish imposed on the victim by provid-
ing her with a means to take control of her life and to take steps that
promise at least substantial improvement of her long term health pros-
deal with cases where the number of potential defendants is overwhelming or where the
dispersal of the toxin is great, but that more localized claims against a limited number of
defendants may well be more manageable under the tort law system. Id. at 44-45. Conced-
ing that the problems of proving toxicity and causation can easily overwhelm a common
law court, Brennan argues that monitoring, by substituting "liability-for-risk" for "liability-
for-loss," has the promise of eliminating or minimizing these problems to the point where
they may be manageable, and that failure to allow monitoring relief may well create a
regime wherein there is too little deterrence of producers of environmentally dangerous
materials. Id. at 65-70.
167. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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pects. This latter gain has no counterpart as a cost to defendant, and
failure to facilitate its realization diminishes social welfare.
Nor would allowing limited relief for emotional distress offend the con-
cerns courts have expressed related to claims for damages for non-inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. If medical monitoring relief is not
seen as compensation for distress already imposed but rather as preven-
tive relief designed to abate ongoing psychological stress, one readily
avoids the difficulties of making nice calculations of what the amount of
damages ought to be for the distress. And medical monitoring relief of-
fered to respond to not only the expected economic harm a plaintiff oth-
erwise would suffer, but also to her emotional distress, eliminates the
economic harm rule taboo on preventing recovery for non-economic torts
by expanding the focus of the lawsuit to resolving non-economic harm.
Given the obvious benefits of allowing some sort of relief for stress, so
long as the problem of avoiding overlarge damages awards for immeasur-
able psychological losses can be avoided, it is surprising that stress claims
have not been recharacterized as not involving emotional damage to
plaintiff, but instead as the right not to be subjected to objectively unrea-
sonable threats to one's well-being. As stated elsewhere, a person claim-
ing emotional distress should complain against
hav[ing] been wrongly subjected to a significant threat of a serious
disease. A cloud has been placed over [the victim's] life, and one can
imagine that cloud of impending death intruding on her life signifi-
cantly. Particularly if the risk is associated with an infectious and
potentially infectious disease, the pall cast not only by the reduced
prospects for normal life-expectancy, but also by the risk of infection,
might undermine her self-confidence or cause her to alter signifi-
cantly her plans, relationships, and activities.169
Properly cast, America's courts should accept a claim that takes care of
mitigating the ongoing harm this kind of ongoing threat poses for toxic
tort victims.
169. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1694. The authors analogized these cases
to claims for false imprisonment. The right involved, they said, is not the right to not be
stressed, but the right to not be threatened; if the threat is real and substantial, the claim
should lie even if plaintiff is not terribly stressed out, though the plaintiff would likely only
get nominal damages in the case where she "remains unflapped" by the stress. Id. at 1695.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIMS
SHOULD BE ALLOWED, BUT ONLY WHEN
RECHARACTERIZED AS EQUITABLE CLAIMS TO COVER
THE COST OF MEICAL SURVEILLANCE WHERE THE
SCREENING HAS SUBSTANTIAL MEDICAL EFFICACY IN
PROVIDING EARLY DETECTION AND POSSIBLE CURE AND
IS LIKELY TO MITIGATE SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
CAUSED BY THE THREAT OF DISEASE
CAUSED BY DEFENDANT
Medical monitoring relief before physical injury manifests itself has re-
ceived broad support from the courts, and it certainly brings many advan-
tages to the litigation system compared to the alternative, which is to
leave plaintiff without remedy unless and until she becomes sick, some-
times years or even decades after the tortfeasor has exposed her to its
toxins. For relatively predictable, though not de minimis costs, medical
monitoring relief can deter tortfeasors and discourage them from passing
onto persons exposed to their toxins the costs of doing business that their
misconduct ultimately inflicts. Though not fully compensatory, it does
defray ordinary and necessary medical expenses a plaintiff may be forced
to undertake because of defendant's misconduct, can improve the plain-
tiff's life prospects and the public health, and certainly can help alleviate
the psychological pain and loneliness suffered by a person threatened
with a terrible, silent disease that will come to fruition, if at all, only after
a long drawn-out latency period.
But monitoring relief has its problems. Unless it is recharacterized as
involving risk of physical injury or alleviating psychological injury, a dam-
ages action for monitoring violates the economic harm rule. More impor-
tantly, its indeterminacy-the fact that it is granted only upon proof of
significant increase of substantial risk of serious harm under circum-
stances where relief should come only when there is a likely and signifi-
cant increase in life prospects because early detection and early treatment
have demonstrable benefits170-has been seen as threatening to lead to
costly litigation of little practical value 171 and possible destruction of a
defendant's assets to the detriment of people who become seriously ill,
but whose illnesses become apparent, because of the long lag time be-
tween exposure and disease symptoms, too late in the litigation
process. 172
None of these problems need stand in the way of monitoring relief,
once it is recharacterized as an equitable means of funding future costs of
screening services defendants have imposed on the plaintiffs and of alle-
viating the sense of stress innocent plaintiffs suffer from exposure to the
toxins of defendant tortfeasors. It has infrequently been noted that most
of the reported medical monitoring cases have indicated a strong prefer-
170. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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ence for requiring the defendant to create or finance some sort of fund or
insurance mechanism to handle medical monitoring claims over time,
rather than simply ordering a lump sum payment of the capitalized value
of future expected medical monitoring costs. 173 While many of these
courts still viewed the relief as involving legal (i.e., non-equitable) relief
assuring a pay-out of future "damages," they rarely explained why;174 the
relief they authorized is perfectly consistent with what an equity court
would do in granting a reparative injunction limiting the prospective ef-
fects of past misconduct 175 where the misconduct itself could not be un-
done and the infliction of future damages is uncertain or so hard to
calculate as to be wildly conjectural. 176
173. See supra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
174. One exception is Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990),
vacated on other grounds, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992), where the court said that a
fund to cover medical monitoring costs must be legal in nature because it involved "pay-
ment of cash.., to reimburse [another] ... for costs incurred." This conclusion is mistaken
in terms of what the parties actually will experience as well as legal theory. See Venugopal,
supra note 42, at 1665-66. The Supreme Court has long noted that equity courts sometimes
require defendants to pay monies to others. See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 895 (1988); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
A number of courts have suggested that characterization of monitoring claims should
turn on whether the relief sought involves judicial creation and supervision of the monitor-
ing regime. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc. 253 F.3d 1180, 1194-96 (9th Cir.
2001); Wilson v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 2004). In the view of these
courts, unless the action contemplates such relief, it is really little more than an action for
damages, however characterized.
This view may or may not prove correct. Even if it does, however, it only means that a
plaintiff could assure herself that her claim would gain equitable characterization by re-
questing that the court require some mechanism for reporting the monitoring results to the
public or to the court and supervise the monitoring program as it unfolds in future years.
Plaintiffs have often refused even to attempt to get their actions characterized as equitable,
in part because they may want jury trial and in part because they want a lump sum recov-
ery to assure full payment of their attorneys. One reason some have sought to have their
claims characterized as equitable lies in an argument that, in class action cases, an equita-
ble characterization of the claim might make class certification easier under Rule 23(b)(2)
and its state counterparts than under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that class issues
"predominate" over non class issues and that class treatment be "superior" to alternative
mechanisms of dispute resolution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. However, it is not altogether
clear that equitable characterization would help solve the class certification problem. See
infra note 192.
175. See Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV.
1065, 1073-75 (1979) (explaining that a reparative injunction is one that prevents future
harm from flowing from a past wrong and distinguishing that from damages, which com-
pensates for a past wrong already sustained). Thus, calling the relief preventative-and
thus appropriate for injunctive relief-is not inconsistent with the notion that some harm
may already have been inflicted. Instead, it simply involves recognition that many injunc-
tions are reparative in nature. When defendant has done a wrong to someone, courts are
unable to roll back the calendar and make it so that the wrong has never been committed,
but they can order the defendant to take steps to limit or mitigate the harm flowing from
the wrong he has done. If a defendant wrongfully lets my horse out of the barn, he cannot
be enjoined from releasing the horse, but he can be required to catch and return the
animal.
176. Monitoring relief, because it is prospective and preventative rather than retrospec-
tive and compensatory, clearly more closely resembles an in specie injunctive remedy than
a substitutionary award of legal damages. Injunctions are allowed where the remedy at law
is inadequate. Inadequacy can flow from many sources, but one of the most common rea-
sons for allowing injunctive relief is to avoid assessment of damages where the assessment
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In an influential article, John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky
suggested that medical monitoring claims should not be characterized as
compensation for economic harm, as was done in cases like Ayers and
Buckley, but rather as preventative equitable relief designed to save lives
by limiting the risk of ultimate mortality or morbidity threatened by ex-
posure to defendant's toxins. 177 Under this view, medical monitoring re-
lief is, at bottom, an injunction against a tortfeasor "to undertake
affirmative efforts to protect plaintiffs who have been exposed to height-
ened risk of disease by their negligence. 1 78 In this same paper, Goldberg
and Zipursky argued for recharacterizing emotional distress claims as
complaints against the threat of serious disease.179
The notion that claims for medical monitoring should be raised in eq-
uity rather than law is not original with writers like Goldberg and Zipur-
sky. Indeed, the earliest monitoring cases treated claims for monitoring
relief as equitable, granting injunctive relief because the courts found that
the remedy at law-damages after injury was sustained-to be inade-
quate. In the earliest medical monitoring case, Friends for All Children v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,180 a federal court of appeals ordered monitor-
ing relief in the form of a preliminary injunction coercing defendant to set
up a fund to defray medical screening costs of members of a plaintiff
group the court felt might suffer irreparable brain damage pendente lite as
a result of the likely, but unproven, wrongdoing of the defendant. Three
years later, in Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,18x a federal district
court refused a motion to dismiss an action for monitoring relief by con-
cluding that the plaintiff's complaint demanding class action monitoring
relief set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court said
the proper relief in the case was an injunction requiring creation of a fund
to cover the cost of medical screening for members of the putative class
of over 5,000 former employees of the defendant whom the plaintiff
sought to represent.' 82 The plaintiff's claim was that the defendant had
exposed its employees at one of its plants, for a period running from 1963
until the plant closed until 1981, to a variety of toxic chemicals without
their consent, and that virtually all of these employees had not only not
yet become ill from these exposures, but in many cases did not even know
of the chemical exposure or the health risk that defendant had placed
would be highly speculative. Ascertaining what valuation to put on plaintiffs ongoing psy-
chological injury is speculative-so much so that many courts refuse to allow damages for
it at all. See supra notes 48-52.
177. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1702-08. See also Venugopal, supra note
42.
178. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1635. Later in the same paper the authors
suggest that the duty to pay monitoring costs closely tracks the duty in tort of one who has
created a dangerous condition that places another in peril and hence in need of affirmative
aid to take steps to rescue the person from the peril. Id. at 1710.
179. Id. at 1694-95. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
180. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 11.
181. 673 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
182. Id. at 1478.
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them under. 183 Under these circumstances, the court ordered the
injunction.
The Barth court concluded that the named plaintiff-who obviously
knew about the exposure and attendant risk-would "likely benefit
from . . . the increased pool of information [the injunction would help
bring to light] . . . and may ease his emotional distress."'1 84 Damages
could not adequately compensate the putative class. It accepted the
plaintiff's argument that only a monitoring program could prevent the
manifestation of harms that otherwise might appear after a lengthy la-
tency period and that might be preventable if diagnosed early. The dam-
ages remedy, the court said, was no substitute for a monitoring program
that would lead to gathering, pooling, and sharing knowledge about the
results of the exposure and provide for early diagnosis and preventive
medical advice. Since the remedy at law for the individual plaintiff and
the class he represented was inadequate, the court held that injunctive
relief was appropriate. 185
Recharacterization of medical monitoring claims along these lines is
long overdue. Reconstituting medical monitoring claims in terms of en-
joining performance of a primary duty rather than seeking compensation
for a completed wrong "explains, at the level of doctrine, the plausibility
of these claims."'1 86 Calling medical monitoring claims suits to recover for
economic losses runs afoul of the economic harm rule, but recognizing
that it may mitigate against future deleterious and debilitating effects of
fear caused by enhanced risk removes them from the limitations of that
rule.187
In Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of allowing
some sort of flexible relief in a future FELA case but balked at upholding
the relief the plaintiff had sought and the lower court had ordered-lump
sum damages;1 88 the Court said the issue of striking the proper balance
between the various considerations favoring or disfavoring monitoring re-
lief would have to await another day.' 89 Recharacterizing medical moni-
toring claims as equitable in nature helps explain the otherwise
mysterious linkage Buckley drew between right and remedy. The duty is
to provide monitoring services, not to pay for them.190
There are additional benefits that would arise from characterizing mon-
itoring claims as equitable rather than legal. Treating monitoring claims
as equitable would mean that they would not normally be triable of right
to a jury, except with respect to common issues of fact of legal claims
183. Id. at 1467-68, 1476-77.
184. Id. at 1477.
185. Id. at 1477-78.
186. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1711.
187. Id. at 1711-12.
188. Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442.
189. Id. at 444.
190. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1712.
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joined with the claims for injunctive relief;191 the impact of such treat-
ment would likely be to cut down on runaway awards actuated by jury
sympathy. The fact that the decision will lie with judges should assuage
some of the fear that opening the door to medical monitoring claims is
inviting a veritable deluge of weak sham claims by phobic or hysterical
plaintiffs joined at the hip with wildly greedy plaintiff's counsel.
Further, calling the claims equitable may help lawyers who would
rather have their medical monitoring claims brought as class actions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and similar state class
action rules, rather than as small claims damages actions maintainable
only under Rule 23(b)(3) and its state equivalents. 192
191. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
192. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1712. Since big litigation may provide
more generous fees and therefore be more likely to attract plaintiffs' lawyers than single-
victim claims, there is a clear interest in the plaintiffs' bar in having class treatment given to
monitoring claims. It has been argued that monitoring claims have a better chance of class
treatment than do other kinds of personal injury claims. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Your Products Liability Hit Parade: A Class Torts "Top 20," 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 169, 213-
14 (2001) (problems of causation less difficult and individualized in monitoring cases than
in personal injury cases); Venugopal, supra note 42 (medical monitoring claims should be
treated as equitable claims under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) and its state counterparts rather
than as damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3), with its requirements of predominance and
right to opt out).
Whether a class claim fairly fits within Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3) may depend on
what kind of relief plaintiff is actually seeking. See, e.g., Phillip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti,
752 A.2d 200, 252 (Md. 2000) (acknowledging that while medical monitoring claims might
be framed in terms of equitable relief and thus fit within Rule 23(b)(2), those seeking
monetary damages as the primary remedy warrant characterization as legal claims fitting
within Rule 23(b)(3)). In some cases, the plaintiff has clearly asked for money damages,
and while the court might prefer that future such cases be brought for equitable relief, it
would be hard to deny that in the particular case at hand plaintiff was seeking money
damages. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (re-
jecting FELA medical monitoring claim for lump sum damages but reserving question
whether FELA claim for equitable order requiring monitoring services might be upheld);
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (1993) (stating preference for equita-
ble trust fund in future but upholding award of legal damages); Ayers v. Township of Jack-
son, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (same).
Even if plaintiffs say that they are seeking an equitable remedy, the lack of cohesiveness
of the plaintiffs' class may foreclose allowing the action to fit within Rule 23(b)(2) and
force plaintiff to comply with Rule 23(b)(3). See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127,
142-43 (3rd Cir. 1998); Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 495 (S.D. Ill. 1999). But
see Venugopal, supra note 42; see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d
913 (Cal. 2003) (medical monitoring action fails under state Rule 23 analogue because it
sets forth a claim for damages and plaintiffs failed to show class issues predominate).
While there have been efforts in some courts to treat medical monitoring claims as Rule
23(b)(2) claims and gain certification under its requirements without demanding that class
issues "predominate" and that class treatment of the action be "superior" to alternatives,
as is required by Rule 23(b)(3), not all courts have been willing to avoid Rule 23(b)(3)'s
requirements through Rule 23(b)(2) characterization of the claims as "equitable." See, e.g.,
Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142-43; Clay, 188 F.R.D. at 495; Wilson v. Brush-Wellman, Inc., 817
N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 2004). Even if the claims are injunctive, there may be good reasons for
treating them as Rule 23 (b)(3) cases; these reasons arise from the disconnected nature of
the class of victims of most toxic torts and the fact that litigation almost inevitably is going
to fragment in determining many individualized issues such as the degree defendant's con-
duct threatens particular plaintiffs with actual injury and the level of monitoring relief ap-
propriate to each plaintiff's case. Indeed, the lack of cohesiveness of the class might well
foreclose giving the action class treatment whether it is characterized as a Rule 23(b)(2)
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Calling the relief equitable explains and justifies making the screening
remedy flexible. This has tremendous practical, as well as theoretical, ad-
vantages over damages awards for sums certain. A number of courts
have suggested that, if the amount of funding for the program of monitor-
ing ordered by the court should require adjusting, the court would retainjurisdiction to make such an adjustment. 193 This provides needed flexibil-
ity in an area in which medical science may change from year to year or
decade to decade-certainly over the life of the injunction-requiring a
change in the medical monitoring regime that reasonable physicians
would recommend and hence, an adjustment of the amount of money
needed to pay for monitoring services.
Treating monitoring claims as equitable has added appeal because it
allows for careful, conservative, discretionary judicial decision-making.
In equity, the court is mandated to balance the equities, and to refuse
granting an injunction when the burden on the plaintiff or on public inter-
ests substantially outweighs the benefits to the plaintiff.194 There is a
wide variety of indeterminate factors that warrant consideration before a
decision should be made as to whether monitoring ought to be ordered,
and if so, what level of monitoring is appropriate. These factors include
the seriousness of the threatened disease, the degree to which a plaintiff's
exposure is likely to have increased her risk levels, both in comparison to
the levels of those in the general population and in absolute terms, the
cost of the various methods of monitoring for given diseases threatened
by the exposure, the efficacy of early detection and treatment of disease
once it should develop, the degree to which the defendant's liability is
blameworthy,195 and-at least in the case of the defendant that claims its
finances threaten it with bankruptcy-the number of other claimants and
the strength of their various claims to the limited funds the defendant
may be able to come up with.196 A judge sitting in equity is far better
action or a Rule 23(b)(3) action. As recent Supreme Court cases have made clear, class
actions in the toxic tort area are fraught with difficulties and conflicts, and courts often will
not certify them as class actions. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (decer-
tifying class action because of conflicts among various plaintiffs in settlement of claims);
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (failing class action because of lack of
predominance of class over individual issues and class representatives failed adequately to
represent absentee members of class).
193. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
194. See DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES 109-12 (2d ed. 1993).
195. Id. at 109-10. For example, in some toxic tort cases, the tort theory is essentially
trespass, in which case only a very low level of scienter may be required; in others, the
theory may involve negligence and the facts may indicate willful disregard of the interests
of others. Treating monitoring claims as simply another kind of damages claim suggests
that the degree to which defendant is at fault should be irrelevant to its liability. This may
be consistent with the fact that the best tort damages analogy to a suit for monitoring
damages comes in the duty to rescue cases, wherein a person who places another in peril,
regardless of fault, owes the person in peril a duty of rescue, and hence is strictly liable in
damages. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1710-11. Given the broad dispersal
of toxic agents by industry in the modem world, such liability might indeed be overbroad.
A judge balancing equities would be able to consider this factor and refuse to grant relief.
196. Critics of medical monitoring have often suggested that monitoring relief is inap-
propriate because it threatens to bankrupt the defendant before the most serious victims of
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qualified than a jury to make these determinations and to balance them.
The broad discretion judges should have in deciding whether to order
medical monitoring relief could also make allowance for normative val-
ues about just when defendants should pay for plaintiff's screening proce-
dures. In deciding liability and relief, judges might wish to take into
consideration factors like the blameworthiness of defendant's conduct
and the ability of plaintiff to pay her own monitoring costs out of pre-
existing insurance policies and the like. Perhaps a merely negligent de-
fendant-or one who is liable only because it is guilty of a technical, non-
negligent trespass-should not pay, while a company that has flaunted
safety regulations and rules in dumping hazardous wastes in crowded
neighborhoods should enjoy less solicitude. While tortfeasors generally
should not be able to shift the costs of their own wrongdoing to others, to
the extent that plaintiffs already carry enough insurance to meet the pub-
lic health and emotional distress concerns, it has been argued that the
desirability of avoiding double recoveries and overinsurance might justify
toleration of such cost shifting and that the problem would resolve itself
in a short time as insurers sought to eliminate coverage in cases where
toxic tortfeasors would be found responsible.
The recharacterization of medical monitoring claims as equitable
mechanisms to relieve plaintiffs of the economic costs that defendants'
conduct may have thrust upon plaintiffs would be incomplete if it were
not also recognized that the monitoring ordered also helps redress, in a
limited but very focused way, the often palpable threat defendants have
created for plaintiffs. In the toxic tort cases, this threat is often not so
small or insignificant that the law should simply blow off the plaintiff with
an admonition to "suck it up" and move on because the law is helpless to
intervene or because she ought to take responsibility for her feelings.
197
Relief clearly ought to be limited to cases in which the threat to plaintiff's
well-being is objectively palpable and real and in which there is a substan-
tial possibility that medical monitoring would improve her morbidity and
mortality by providing early diagnosis and possible cure. In such a set-
ting, the fear of frivolous or faked damages claims for emotional distress
would disappear, and the relief granted-payment for monitoring costs to
provide early detection and cure-would narrowly lift at least part of the
pall defendant's conduct has placed over plaintiff's life and alleviate some
defendant's misconduct develop serious, life threatening illnesses, and that in cases where a
victim has prepaid for her own health insurance it is wrong to order defendant to under-
write her screening costs. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text. Treated as all-or-
nothing arguments, neither position is persuasive. Not all toxic tort judgments for moni-
toring threaten bankruptcy, and it is not unjust on its face to force defendants to pay for
wrongs simply because plaintiffs have prepaid a collateral source to cover their losses. But
equity would not have to accept these all-or-nothing arguments . Instead, where bank-
ruptcy of defendant was in the offing, the judge could decide not to allow monitoring relief,
to limit its availability to those lacking insurance, or to raise the threshold of liability re-
garding seriousness of future threat to accommodate the public and private interests at
stake in the case.
197. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1681-82, 1686-87.
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of the emotional distress plaintiff suffers because defendant has scared
her out of her wits. While not full compensation for what may be immea-
surable losses, provision of monitoring services helps to mitigate (though
it cannot fully prevent) future emotional distress and physical injury, and
is but a small price the defendant ought to bear for the threat it has cast
off onto the plaintiff.
